



The Financial Crisis: An Inside View
ABSTRACT This paper reviews the policy response to the 2007–09 ﬁnan-
cial crisis from the perspective of a senior Treasury ofﬁcial at the time. Gov-
ernment agencies faced severe constraints in addressing the crisis: lack of
legal authority for potentially helpful ﬁnancial stabilization measures, a Con-
gress reluctant to grant such authority, and the need to act quickly in the midst
of a market panic. Treasury ofﬁcials recognized the dangers arising from
mounting foreclosures and worked to facilitate limited mortgage modiﬁca-
tions, but going further was politically unacceptable because public funds
would have gone to some irresponsible borrowers. The suddenness of Bear
Stearns’ collapse in March 2008 made rescue necessary and led to preparation
of emergency options should conditions worsen. The Treasury saw Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac’s rescue that summer as necessary to calm markets,
despite the moral hazard created. After Lehman Brothers failed in September,
the Treasury genuinely intended to buy illiquid securities from troubled insti-
tutions but turned to capital injections as the crisis deepened.
T
his paper reviews the events associated with the credit market disrup-
tion that began in August 2007 and developed into a full-blown crisis
in the fall of 2008. This is necessarily an incomplete history: events con-
tinued to unfold as I was writing it, in the months immediately after I left
the Treasury, where I served as assistant secretary for economic policy
from December 2006 to the end of the George W. Bush administration on
January 20, 2009. It is also necessarily a selective one: the focus is on key
decisions made at the Treasury with respect to housing and ﬁnancial mar-
kets policies, and on the constraints faced by decisionmakers at the Trea-
sury and other agencies over this period. I examine broad policy matters
and economic decisions but do not go into the financial details of speciﬁc
transactions, such as those involving the government-sponsored enter-
prises (GSEs) and the rescue of the American International Group (AIG)
insurance company.
I ﬁrst explain some constraints on the policy process—legal, political,
and otherwise—that were perhaps not readily apparent to outsiders such as
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ruled out several policy approaches that might have appeared attractive in
principle, such as forcing lenders to troubled ﬁrms to swap their bonds for
equity. I then proceed with a chronological discussion, starting with prepa-
rations taken at the Treasury in 2006 and moving on to policy proposals
considered in the wake of the August 2007 lockup of the asset-backed
commercial paper market.
The main development following the events of August was a new focus
on housing and in particular on foreclosure prevention, embodied in the
Hope Now Alliance. The Treasury sought to have mortgage servicers (the
ﬁrms that collect monthly payments on behalf of lenders) make economic
decisions with respect to loan modiﬁcations—to modify loans when this
was less costly than foreclosure. This approach involved no expenditure of
public money, and it focused on borrowers who could avoid foreclosure
through a moderate reduction in their monthly mortgage payment. People
whose mortgage balance far exceeded the value of their home—so-called
deeply underwater borrowers—would still have an incentive to walk away
and allow their lender to foreclose.
But political constraints bound tightly in addressing this situation, since
there was little appetite in Congress for a program that would transparently
reward “irresponsible” borrowers who had purchased homes they could
never have hoped to afford. Even after the October 2008 enactment of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) gave the Treasury
the resources and authority to put public money into foreclosure avoidance,
the need to husband limited resources against worsening ﬁnancial sector
problems ruled out undertaking a foreclosure avoidance program at the
necessary scale until after the change in administrations in January 2009.
The foreclosure avoidance initiative eventually implemented by the Obama
administration in March 2009, which took the form of an interest rate
subsidy, was a refinement of a proposal developed at the Treasury in
October 2007.
Returning to events on Wall Street, the paper picks up the chronology
with the failure of Bear Stearns in early 2008, the rescue of the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that summer,
and the failures of the investment bank Lehman Brothers and AIG the
week of September 14, 2008. The run on money market mutual funds in
the wake of Lehman’s collapse led to a lockup of the commercial paper
market and spurred the Treasury to seek from Congress a $700 billion
fund—the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)—with which to pur-
chase illiquid assets from banks in order to alleviate uncertainty about
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market conditions continued to deteriorate even after the early-October
enactment of EESA, the Treasury shifted from asset purchases to capital
injections directly into banks, including the surviving large investment
banks that had either become bank holding companies or merged with
other banks. The capital injections, together with a Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) program to guarantee bank debt, eventually
helped foster ﬁnancial sector stability. Even in late 2008, however, contin-
ued market doubts about the ﬁnancial condition of Citigroup and Bank of
America led the Treasury and the Fed to jointly provide additional capital
and “ring fence” insurance for some of the assets on these ﬁrms’ balance
sheets. In effect, providing insurance through nonrecourse ﬁnancing from
the Fed meant that taxpayers owned much of the downside of these ﬁrms’
illiquid assets.
The paper concludes with a brief discussion of several key lessons of
the events of the fall of 2008. An essential insight regarding the policies
undertaken throughout the fall is that providing insurance through non-
recourse ﬁnancing is economically similar to buying assets—indeed, under-
pricing insurance is akin to overpaying for assets. But insurance is much
less transparent than either asset purchases or capital injections, and there-
fore politically preferable as a means of providing subsidies to ﬁnancial
market participants. A second lesson is that maintaining public support is
essential to allowing these transfers to take place. These two lessons
appear to have informed the policies put into place in the ﬁrst part of 2009.
I. Constraints on the Policy Process
Legal constraints were omnipresent throughout the crisis, since the Trea-
sury and other government agencies such as the Fed necessarily operate
within existing legal authorities. Given these constraints, some steps that
are attractive in principle turn out to be impractical in reality, two key
examples being the notion of forcing investors to enter into debt-for-equity
swaps to address debt overhangs, and that of forcing banks to accept gov-
ernment capital. These both run hard afoul of the constraint that there is no
legal mechanism to make them happen. A lesson for academics is that any
time they use the verb “force” (as in “The policy should be to force banks
to do X or Y”), the next sentence should set forth the section of the U.S.
legal code that allows that course of action. Otherwise the policy sugges-
tion is of theoretical but not practical interest. Legal constraints bound in
other ways as well, including with respect to modiﬁcations of loans.
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this runs hard into the political constraint: getting a bill through Congress
is much easier said than done. This difﬁculty was especially salient in 2007
and 2008, the first two years after both chambers of Congress switched
from Republican to Democratic leadership. A distrustful relationship
between the congressional leadership and President Bush and his White
House staff made 2007 an unconstructive year from the perspective of eco-
nomic policy, although, ironically, it had the effect of making possible the
rapid enactment of the early-2008 stimulus: Democratic leaders by then
appeared to be eager to demonstrate that they could govern effectively.
More legislative actions were taken in 2008 as the credit crisis worsened
and the economy slowed, but political constraints remained a constant
factor in the administration’s deliberations.
Political constraints were an important factor in the reluctance at the
Treasury to put forward proposals to address the credit crisis early in 2008.
The options that later turned into the TARP were ﬁrst written down at the
Treasury in March 2008: buy assets, insure them, inject capital into ﬁnan-
cial institutions, or massively expand federally guaranteed mortgage reﬁ-
nance programs to improve asset performance from the bottom up. But we
at the Treasury saw little prospect of getting legislative approval for any of
these steps, including a massive program to avoid foreclosures. Legislative
action would be possible only when Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke could go to Congress and attest
that the crisis was at the doorstep, even though by then it could well be too
late to head it off.
Political constraints also affected the types of legislative authorities that
could be requested in the ﬁrst place, notably with regard to the initial con-
ception of the TARP. Secretary Paulson truly meant to acquire troubled
assets in order to stabilize the financial system when he and Chairman
Bernanke met with congressional leaders on Thursday, September 18,
2008, to request a $700 billion fund for that purpose. One criticism of the
initial “Paulson plan” is that it would have been better to inject capital into
the system in the ﬁrst place, since the banking system was undercapital-
ized, and asset purchases inject capital only to the extent that too high a
price is paid. But Congress would never have approved a proposal to inject
capital. House Republicans would have balked at voting to allow the gov-
ernment to buy a large chunk of the banking system, and Democrats would
not have voted for such an unpopular bill without a reasonable number of
Republican votes to provide political cover.
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the context of a continuous cascade of market events. Certainly this was
the case by the week of September 14, 2008, when Lehman Brothers and
AIG both failed; a major money market mutual fund, the Reserve Fund,
“broke the buck,” allowing its value per share to fall below the $1 par
level; a panicked ﬂight from money market mutual funds ensued; and then
the commercial paper market locked up, with major industrial companies
that relied on commercial paper issuance telling the Treasury that they
faced imminent liquidity problems. This was the situation in which the
TARP was proposed, and the decisions and actions surrounding its cre-
ation must be understood in the context of the events of that week. Time
constraints meant that sometimes blunt actions were taken, notably the
guarantees on the liabilities of AIG, of money market mutual funds, and
several weeks later of banks’ qualiﬁed new senior debt issues. A blanket
guarantee is certainly not a preferred policy approach, but in the face of
broad runs on the ﬁnancial system, guarantees were needed to deal with the
problems in real time.
Other impediments to decisionmaking were self-imposed hurdles rather
than external constraints. Notable among these was chronic disorganization
within the Treasury itself, a broadly haphazard policy process within the
administration, and sometimes strained relations between the Treasury and
White House staff that made it difficult to harness the full energies of the
administration in a common direction. To many observers, the Treasury
also lacked an appreciation that the rationales behind its actions and deci-
sions were not being explained in sufﬁcient detail; without understanding
the motivation for each decision, outside observers found it difﬁcult to
anticipate what further steps would be taken as events unfolded. Part of the
problem was simply the difficulty of keeping up, of providing adequate
explanation in real time as decisions were being made rapidly, while
another part was a lack of trust in the Treasury and the administration.
Many journalists and other observers did not believe simple (and truthful)
explanations for actions. For example, the switch from asset purchases to
capital injections really was a response to market developments. It was too
easy—and wrong—to believe that Secretary Paulson was looking out for
the interests of Wall Street, or even of a particular ﬁrm, rather than the
interests of the nation as he saw them. Whatever the reason, such commu-
nication gaps led to natural skepticism as the Treasury’s approach to the
crisis evolved in the fall. There were valid reasons behind the initial plan to
purchase assets (even if many people found them inadequate), and valid
PHILLIP SWAGEL 5
11641-01a_Swagel_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:45 PM  Page 5reasons for the switch to capital injections. But the insufﬁcient explana-
tions of these moves led to skepticism and growing hostility in Congress
and beyond to the rescue plan as a whole.
Notwithstanding these criticisms with regard to the Treasury, a paper
such as this will inevitably be seen as defensive, if not outright self-serving.
Since this is unavoidable, I simply acknowledge it up front. Other accounts
of the credit crisis will come out in due course and can be correlated with
the discussion here.
II. On the Verge of Crisis
Secretary Paulson, on his arrival at the Treasury in summer 2006, told
Treasury staff that it was time to prepare for a ﬁnancial system challenge.
As he put it, credit market conditions had been so easy for so long that
many market participants were not prepared for a ﬁnancial shock with sys-
temic implications. His frame of reference was the market dislocations of
1998 following the Russian debt default and the collapse of the hedge fund
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). Starting that summer, Treasury
staff worked to identify potential ﬁnancial market challenges and policy
responses, both in the near term and over the horizon. The longer-range
policy discussions eventually turned into the March 2008 Treasury Blue-
print for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure. Possible near-term
situations that were considered included sudden exogenous crises such as
terror attacks, natural disasters, or massive power blackouts; market-
driven events such as the failure of a major ﬁnancial institution, a large
sovereign default, or huge losses at hedge funds; as well as slower-moving
macroeconomic developments such as an energy price shock, a prolonged
economic downturn that sparked wholesale corporate bankruptcies, or a
large and disorderly movement in the exchange value of the dollar. These
problems were not seen as imminent in mid- to late 2006.
The focus at the Treasury was on risk mitigation beforehand and on
preparing broad outlines of appropriate responses in the event that a crisis
did develop, always recognizing that the details would vary with the situa-
tion. To help ensure smooth teamwork in the event of a problem, Secretary
Paulson reinvigorated the President’s Working Group on Financial Mar-
kets (PWG), which had been formed after the October 1987 stock market
crash. The PWG brought together senior ofﬁcials from the Treasury, the
Fed, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodi-
ties Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to discuss ﬁnancial and eco-
nomic developments and potential problems. The heads of these agencies
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level was both frequent and routine. Secretary Paulson also talked regu-
larly in both public and private settings about the need for ﬁnancial institu-
tions to prepare for an end to abnormally loose ﬁnancial conditions.
Treasury staff recognized that changes in ﬁnancial markets since 1998
would affect the contours of any new ﬁnancial crisis and the policy response.
These developments generally had positive impacts in that they contributed
to increased ﬁnancial market efﬁciency, but they often increased complex-
ity as well. Such developments included
—Deeper international capital market integration. Tighter linkages
between ﬁnancial markets in different countries lowered ﬁnancing costs
for U.S. borrowers, given the low national saving rate and the need to
import capital to fund spending. But under some views of the interna-
tional ﬁnancial architecture, capital market integration also contributed to
the housing bubble that helped precipitate the crisis.
—The rise of securitization. Financial assets of all types, including
credit card debt, auto loans, and residential and commercial mortgages,
were increasingly being packaged into ever more complex securities.
Securitization reduced ﬁnance costs and contributed to stronger aggregate
demand; it also allowed the risks of lending to be diversiﬁed more widely
across market participants than if the loans had remained on bank balance
sheets. These beneﬁts, however, came with the downsides of increased
complexity and diminished transparency. When problems with mortgage
performance did emerge, the bundling of mortgages into securities made
it difﬁcult to gauge the distribution and magnitude of credit losses.
—The growth of private pools of capital. Hedge funds and private
equity ﬁrms were becoming increasingly important players. The rise of
these nontraditional asset managers should in general increase the efﬁ-
ciency of ﬁnancial markets: the presence in the market of asset manage-
ment approaches that include both long and short positions rather than
just long would be expected to improve liquidity and efﬁciency. But these
funds tend to be nontransparent; indeed, calls for increased disclosure of
their trading positions are at odds with the hedge fund business model.
Particularly in Europe, hedge funds were seen as the source of the next
ﬁnancial markets crisis. In the event, many hedge funds suffered massive
losses in 2007 and 2008, and their deleveraging certainly contributed to
the downward spiral in asset markets. But hedge funds do not appear to
have been the fundamental source of the problem.
—The growth of ﬁnancial derivatives. New ﬁnancial instruments such as
credit default swaps increased ﬁnancial market efﬁciency by allowing mar-
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modities, bonds, equities, or currencies. But these derivatives added com-
plexity and reduced transparency and further facilitated increased leverage.
By September 2008, worsening performance of securitized housing assets
such as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) led to rapid and massive
deterioration of the balance sheets of ﬁrms such as AIG and Lehman.
Derivatives also led to increased interconnectedness of markets, as the
over-the-counter nature of credit default swaps and many repo (repurchase
agreement) transactions meant that difﬁculties at ﬁnancial institutions such
as Bear Stearns, Lehman, and AIG could have broad impacts through their
role as counterparties to these transactions. These considerations were to
play important roles in decisions made throughout 2008 regarding the
deployment of public funds to “bail out” particular institutions.
Broadly speaking, these ﬁnancial innovations were viewed at Treasury
as fundamentally a good thing in that they added to the liquidity and efﬁ-
ciency of capital markets and made it easier for ﬁrms and investors to lay
off risk. Even so, the concern was that it was not clear how the evolving
ﬁnancial system would perform under stress. Under Secretary of the Trea-
sury for Domestic Finance Robert Steel talked to Treasury staff about the
challenge of trying to ﬁgure out in advance how correlations between asset
classes would change in a crisis. He pointed out that before the terror
attacks of September 11, 2001, a reasonable way to diversify a real estate
portfolio would have been to invest in high-rise ofﬁce buildings in differ-
ent cities, but that the returns on these investments suddenly became cor-
related in the wake of the attacks. The same would be likely to happen in a
time of ﬁnancial crisis: ﬁnancial structures that had worked before would
break down in unexpected ways.
Finally, Secretary Paulson and Under Secretary Steel tried hard in the
fall of 2006, but did not succeed, in getting a reform bill through Congress
that would give the GSEs’ regulator, the Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enter-
prise Oversight (OFHEO), more power to limit the activities of the two
major GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The push on this issue came
over opposition from some White House staff, who took the reasonable posi-
tion that no deal on GSEs was better than one that appeared to strengthen
these ﬁrms’ implicit government backing without fully empowering their
regulator.
My own introduction to the building credit bubble came at a talk I gave
early in 2007 to a group of ﬁnancial industry participants in commercial
real estate—the ﬁrms that build, fund, and invest in ofﬁce buildings, facto-
ries, shopping centers, and apartments. Participants told me that there was
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dreamed up could be ﬁnanced. Although this talk was alarming, economic
indicators seemed to back it up: GDP growth had slowed in the second half
of 2006 but looked to be strong again in 2007 (as it proved to be in the
middle two quarters of the year), and the labor market upswing that had
taken hold in mid-2003 remained in force. Indeed, Secretary Paulson’s
public message was that growth had been unsustainably strong and that it
would be no surprise to have a period of slower growth as the economy
settled into a more normal pattern.
By early 2007 we at the Treasury were well aware of the looming prob-
lems in housing, especially among subprime borrowers as foreclosure rates
increased and subprime mortgage originators such as New Century went
out of business. Under Secretary Steel took the lead in organizing a series
of interagency meetings to discuss the situation. As part of this, he asked
for forward-looking analysis on housing prices, home sales and starts,
and foreclosure rates—how bad would it get and what would be the eco-
nomic implications? Economists at the Treasury and the Fed separately
did empirical work relating foreclosures to economic conditions such as
the unemployment rate, housing prices, and past foreclosure rates. (The
Fed work looked at a panel of pooled state data; the Treasury’s approach
was a time-series model, looking at the nation as a whole and at key states
with high or rising foreclosure rates: the Midwest, the Gulf Coast, and bub-
ble states such as California and Florida.) At the Treasury, we then used
Blue Chip forecasts for future economic data and ran a dynamic forecast of
future foreclosures. The prediction we made at an interagency meeting in
May 2007 was that foreclosure starts would remain elevated and the inven-
tory of foreclosed homes would continue to build throughout 2007, but
that the foreclosure problem would subside after a peak in 2008.
What we at the Treasury missed was that our regressions did not use
information on the quality of the underwriting of subprime mortgages in
2005, 2006, and 2007. This was something pointed out by staff from the
FDIC, who had already (correctly) reported that the situation in housing
was bad and getting worse and would have important implications for the
banking system and the broader economy.
As shown in ﬁgure 1, which is from the Fed’s July 2008 Monetary Pol-
icy Report to the Congress, default rates on subprime adjustable-rate mort-
gages (ARMs) originated in 2005, 2006, and early 2007 were substantially
higher than in previous years, and the defaults were coming quickly,
within months of origination. The problems were baked into the mortgage
at origination in a way that they had not been before 2005; they were not a
PHILLIP SWAGEL 9
11641-01a_Swagel_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:45 PM  Page 9function of the cooling economy, except in the sense that the end of easy
mortgage terms and the reversal of home price gains removed the possibil-
ity of reﬁnancing for subprime borrowers. It is interesting to note as well
that the default rates in ﬁgure 1 do not have an inﬂection point upward at
the 24-month mark, when the interest rate typically adjusts upward in a
“reset.” There was, however, a marked propensity for borrowers to reﬁ-
nance at the reset date. These facts further indicated that the problem in the
2005–07 loans was the initial underwriting, not the interest rate reset. It
was not that these borrowers could not afford the higher interest rate after
the reset—the rapid defaults suggested that borrowers could not afford the
initial home payment, or perhaps (rationally) did not want to keep paying
the monthly bill once the value of their home had declined below their
mortgage balance.
III. August 2007: The Vacation of the Blackberry
The initial moment for an urgent Treasury-wide response came in August
2007, when asset-backed commercial paper markets seized up as investors
grew skeptical about the business model of banks’ off-balance-sheet struc-
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Figure 1. Cumulative Defaults on Subprime 2/28 Loans, by Year of Origination,
2001–07
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ﬁnance longer-term assets. Many Treasury ofﬁcials, including myself,
were not in Washington when this crisis broke. I was in Rehoboth Beach,
Delaware, where up and down the boardwalk one could see as many
Blackberrys being toted around as tubes of suntan lotion.
Many papers have since examined the economic and ﬁnancial factors
that led to the crisis; Markus Brunnermeier (2009) provides a discussion.
Within the Treasury, the ﬁnancial market disruption was seen as the after-
math of twin credit and housing bubbles, with repricing of risk across asset
classes and consequent deleveraging across ﬁnancial institutions coming
about as information on the poor underwriting quality in the past several
years became more widely understood (this is discussed in detail by Gorton
2008), and as several ﬁnancial institutions announced dismal results reﬂect-
ing losses from subprime lending.
Two main policy proposals aimed at calming the ﬁnancial markets
emerged from the August episode: the so-called Master Liquidity Enhance-
ment Conduit (MLEC), or “Super SIV,” a common vehicle in which banks
would hold their illiquid assets, and a mortgage information database that
would provide individual loan-level information on the quality of under-
writing and subsequent performance of mortgages, and thereby facilitate
analysis of complex MBSs and their derivatives. Neither of these efforts
came to fruition, although the American Securitization Forum (ASF) inde-
pendently began to work on a mortgage database under the rubric of their
“Project Restart.” A byproduct of the August credit meltdown that did
come to fruition was the formation of the Hope Now Alliance aimed at
reducing foreclosures. This is discussed further below.
The idea behind the mortgage information database was to directly
address the lack of transparency and information behind the August lockup
of the markets for asset-backed securities. A database could be organized to
provide market participants with loan-level information on mortgage origi-
nation and ongoing performance. The data would be anonymously tagged
with an identiﬁcation number akin to a CUSIP on a security. This could be
done on a forward-looking basis for new mortgages as they were securi-
tized into MBSs, or on a backward-looking basis for existing MBSs. The
latter would be much more difﬁcult: servicers were already overwhelmed
by the volume of loan modiﬁcation requests and did not want to be diverted
by a backward-looking project. Investors could use the information in the
database to analyze the performance of MBSs and collateralized debt obli-
gations (CDOs) containing the mortgages, allowing analysis to pierce the
complexity of these arrangements (as I put it in a speech in February
PHILLIP SWAGEL 11
11641-01a_Swagel_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:45 PM  Page 112008). Ultimately, the database would allow investors to assess the perfor-
mance of mortgages originated by particular ﬁrms or even particular loan
ofﬁcers. This would create a “reputational tail” so that originators would
have a connection to the future performance of mortgages even after they
had been ofﬂoaded from their books through securitization. This reputa-
tional tail could be a less intrusive alternative to the suggestion that lenders
be required to keep a piece of any loans they originate—that they have
“skin in the game.” A database could also help overcome the informational
problem posed by second liens, which are often not visible to the servicer
of the ﬁrst mortgage and pose an obstacle to loan modiﬁcation. What was
surprising was that this database did not exist already—that investors in
MBSs had not demanded the information from the beginning.
With the freeze of the asset-backed commercial paper market leaving
assets stuck in banks’ SIVs, ofﬁcials in the Treasury’s Ofﬁce of Domestic
Finance developed the MLEC plan as a temporary “bridge” structure to
give participating institutions time to reprice and reassess risk. The idea
was that the value of the complex securities held by bank SIVs was not
well understood and that it would be useful for institutions to hold their
illiquid assets in a common pool until there was more clarity on perfor-
mance. An orderly disposal of the illiquid assets, it was thought, would
avoid banks having to sell off assets into a thin market at ﬁre-sale prices.
Under the MLEC proposal, banks would have agreed on a multilateral
pricing mechanism for the illiquid assets and taken pro rata shares of a
common pool, which would have then turned into something close to a
buy-and-hold investment vehicle, with the intent being to unwind the port-
folio as markets stabilized. The MLEC concept implicitly rested on the
assumption that trading had ground to a halt because uncertainty about asset
performance gave rise to a liquidity premium. The metaphor of choice was
“mad cow disease”: investors could not tell which asset-backed securities
were toxic, so they chose not to touch any of them. MLEC would have pro-
vided a breathing space under which conditions would return to some new
“normal” (not a new bubble), and bid-ask spreads would have narrowed
and trading naturally resumed. Of course, such a pause is of little use if
the problem is fundamentally one of insufficient capital, not liquidity—
as turned out to be the case.
Ofﬁcials in the Ofﬁce of Domestic Finance brought together market par-
ticipants at a Sunday meeting at the Treasury to discuss MLEC. The meet-
ing and the whole MLEC concept were something of a mystery to many
Treasury senior staff—including me. MLEC was seen within the Treasury
and portrayed to the world as a private sector solution. Some doubtful
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ber of economists at investment banks wondered if the supposed utility of
the idea in the ﬁrst place rested upon a violation of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem (meaning that they did not see the utility). MLEC never got off the
ground; in the end, banks preferred to take the SIV assets back onto their
balance sheets—thus demonstrating the tenuous nature of the off-balance-
sheet treatment in the ﬁrst place. When the banks in the end chose to deal
with the problem on their own, the MLEC episode looked to the world, and
to many within the Treasury, like a basketball player going up in the air to
pass without an open teammate in mind—a rough and awkward situation.
Ironically, the Treasury bank rescue plan unveiled by the Obama adminis-
tration in late March 2009 had elements of MLEC in that institutions are
supposed to partner with the federal government to purchase pools of
assets. That version, however, has the (huge) advantage of being able to
fund the purchases through low-cost government ﬁnancing, with taxpayers
assuming much of the downside risk.
IV. Housing Policy and Foreclosure Avoidance
Throughout 2007, staff at the Treasury and other government agencies pre-
pared numerous analyses and memos on the situation in housing. There
was a keen awareness of the serious problems facing households with sub-
prime mortgages, and a rising concern that households with prime mort-
gages would soon exhibit a similar pattern of rising delinquencies and
foreclosures. It was also clear that there were two types of housing prob-
lems. In some states in the Midwest and along the Gulf Coast, high delin-
quency and foreclosure rates reﬂected weak economies or the continued
aftermath of the 2005 hurricanes. This was a traditional problem, in which
the causality ran from the economy to housing. The other problem was
found in states that were on the downside of housing bubbles, notably Ari-
zona, California, Florida, and Nevada. In these areas, foreclosures reﬂected
the steep declines in home prices and limited availability of credit for mar-
ginal buyers, which together put at risk subprime borrowers who had
bought homes in 2004 to early 2007 in the expectation that rising home
prices would give them equity with which to reﬁnance out of their sub-
prime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). The end of the bubble had closed
off this option and left borrowers in danger.
Rising foreclosure rates among subprime borrowers led to pressures—
both political and economic—for the Treasury and the administration to do
something to assist families at risk of foreclosure. The chairman of the
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and allowing for risk-based pricing of insurance premiums so that the FHA could insure
loans to yet riskier borrowers by charging them higher premiums. Such risk-based pricing
was a political red line for many in Congress, who saw it as unfair to charge more to the peo-
ple in the worst ﬁnancial condition and thus in the greatest need of assistance.
FDIC, Sheila Bair, correctly identiﬁed the rising foreclosure problem early
on and pushed for the administration to take action.
IV.A. Initial Measures
Housing policy was seen as involving two main dimensions: a “forward-
looking” one relating to measures that would boost demand for housing,
including through housing-speciﬁc policies such as a tax credit for home-
buyers (possibly ﬁrst-time buyers only) or as part of an economy-wide
stimulus, and “backward-looking” policies to help existing homeowners at
risk of foreclosure. The administration’s response to the housing crisis as
of September 2007 included three main proposals, all requiring congres-
sional action. All three might have been worthwhile—indeed, all eventu-
ally were enacted in one form or another—but they were dissatisfying in
their limited scope.
The ﬁrst proposal was a set of changes to the legislation governing the
Federal Housing Authority (FHA) that would allow additional low- and
moderate-income homeowners to reﬁnance into FHA-guaranteed loans.
1
This was on top of a program known as FHASecure, which allowed reﬁ-
nancing by borrowers who had become delinquent because the interest rate
on their ARM had increased. All together, the proposals involving the
FHA were seen as helping perhaps 500,000 families. The FHA had gained
substantial market share as private sector subprime lending disappeared in
2007, and there were concerns that the agency was near its capacity, not
least because Congress had not approved funding requested by the admin-
istration to update its computer systems.
The second proposal was a change to the tax code, eventually enacted,
that forgave the tax due from a borrower whose debt is canceled by the
lender, for example when a borrower walks away from a home without
paying off the mortgage. The existing tax law treated this reduction in debt
as income to the borrower. This change did not boost housing demand or
prevent foreclosures but was seen as avoiding an unfair tax bill for people
who had just lost their home.
The third proposal was the long-standing effort by the administration to
improve the regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The idea was that
a strong and independent regulator could better ensure the safety and
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ﬁnancial wherewithal to provide continued ﬁnancing to mortgage markets.
GSE reform was ﬁnally enacted as part of the summer 2008 housing bill,
by which time it was too late to avert insolvency at the two ﬁrms.
The initial focus of housing policy was on the difﬁculties faced by
homeowners in subprime ARMs who were facing an interest rate reset,
typically two years (but sometimes three years or more) after origination.
The concern by mid-2007 was that many families would not be able to
afford the resulting higher payments. (The term “payment shock” was
used, although this is a misnomer of sorts, since the interest rate hike was
not a surprise but instead the central feature of the mortgage.) FDIC
Chairman Bair, for example, argued that up to 1.75 million homeowners
could beneﬁt from keeping the interest rate on these subprime mortgages
unchanged rather than allowing the rate to reset. Although we at the Trea-
sury agreed that about 1.8 million subprime ARMs would face resets in
2008 to 2010, our assessment was that the driver of foreclosures was the
original underwriting, not the reset. Too many borrowers were in the
wrong house, not the wrong mortgage. Moreover, as the Fed cut interest
rates in late 2007, the rates to which mortgage resets were tied came down
as well, reducing or even eliminating the payment shock for many sub-
prime borrowers. This meant that preventing interest rate resets was not
likely by itself to avert many foreclosures.
IV.B. Hope Now
To better identify avenues for effective solutions, the Treasury convened
meetings in the fall of 2007 with groups of housing industry participants,
including lenders, servicers, nonproﬁt housing counselors, and organiza-
tions representing investors in MBSs. What became apparent through
this dialogue was that frictions and communication gaps between hous-
ing industry participants meant that some homeowners faced foreclosure
unnecessarily. The Hope Now Alliance was formed to address these issues.
The Hope Now Alliance was launched by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) and the Treasury on October 10, 2007. As
the organization puts it on its website, Hope Now is an alliance among
HUD-approved counseling agents, mortgage companies, investors, and
other mortgage market participants that provides free foreclosure preven-
tion assistance. The Treasury saw an important part of the initial work
done through Hope Now as basic “blocking and tackling” (football was a
preferred source of metaphors in the Paulson Treasury) in getting industry
participants to work together and with borrowers more smoothly. The ﬁrst
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another, but this was not happening in a surprisingly high proportion of
instances: some estimates were that half of foreclosures started without
any contact between the borrower and the lender or servicer. Failures of
outreach were observed in all directions: servicers were frustrated at the
low response rate of borrowers to their letters and phone calls, while many
borrowers who did reach out on their own found it difﬁcult to get to the
right person for help at their servicer or lender. In some cases they could
not get help until they were already substantially delinquent, even if they
had seen the problem coming. Nonproﬁt housing counselors had a valuable
role to play, since they were often seen by borrowers as a neutral party, and
tended to report higher response rates from at-risk borrowers. But counsel-
ing was something of a patchwork, with uncertain funding and unclear
relationships between counselors and lenders. Counselors would tell the
Treasury that they worked well with some lenders and servicers but could
not get in the door at others; servicers had similar issues with uneven rela-
tionships in the other direction. For their part, servicers were still hesi-
tantly exploring the legal room they had to modify loans, and they faced
resource constraints in that their contracts did not envision the need for
large-scale modiﬁcation efforts to avoid foreclosures.
2
Hope Now brought together the leading subprime servicers, national
counseling agencies (including the highly regarded NeighborWorks organi-
zation), and industry and investor trade associations such as the Mortgage
Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association, and the ASF. The inclusion of
industry associations was helpful, providing a channel through which to
bring together ﬁrms across the housing ecosystem. Getting the servicers
involved was essential, since they were the point of contact between the
industry and individual borrowers. From the outset, servicers accounting
for about half of subprime mortgages participated in Hope Now; this grew
to cover better than 90 percent of subprime and 70 percent of all loans by
mid-2008. (The potential coverage is limited because some banks service
their own mortgages.) This effort was backstopped by intense involve-
ment of Treasury staff (particularly Neel Kashkari, then a senior adviser
to Secretary Paulson who had come up with the idea) and substantial per-
sonal involvement by Paulson himself. Participants in Hope Now com-
mitted to creating a uniﬁed plan to reach homeowners and help them avoid
foreclosure.
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with the goal of reaching troubled borrowers early enough so that a loan
modiﬁcation could at least be contemplated. A national foreclosure coun-
seling hotline (888-995-HOPE) was set up, along with a publicity campaign
to advertise it, featuring public service announcements and public events
with government ofﬁcials, including President Bush. Hope Now arranged
for servicers to provide funding for the nonproﬁt counselors (who had pre-
viously relied on government and foundation resources), standardized
communication protocols between counselors and servicers, and collected
systematic data on the number of people helped and the modiﬁcations
made. Participants in Hope Now agreed to provide subprime borrowers
with information about their reset four months in advance, and to send
high-visibility letters to all borrowers who became 60 days delinquent,
urging them to call the Hope Now hotline. This kind of outreach sounds
basic, but it was unprecedented for the industry. Hope Now reported that
the call volume on its hotline surged in late 2007 and into 2008.
The next step was to follow up these activities with a systematic
approach to help at-risk borrowers reﬁnance or obtain a loan modiﬁcation
that would avoid a foreclosure. The fundamental goal was to “avoid pre-
ventable foreclosures.” As Secretary Paulson and others were to say
repeatedly, this meant that the Treasury was looking for ways to help
homeowners who were struggling with their mortgage payments but both
wanted to stay in their home and had the basic ﬁnancial wherewithal to do
so. “Wanting to stay” meant that the homeowner would not walk away
from a home as long as he or she could afford the monthly payment. “Basic
ﬁnancial wherewithal” meant that the Treasury’s efforts were aimed at get-
ting mortgage servicers to modify loans for homeowners with subprime
ARMs who could afford their payments at the initial (pre-reset) interest
rate, where the cost to the beneﬁcial owner of the mortgage of modifying
the loan was less than the loss that would be suffered in a foreclosure. Not
every foreclosure could be prevented through a modiﬁcation—after all,
over 600,000 foreclosures occur in a “normal” year. But we at the Treasury
wanted to make sure that no borrowers got foreclosed on who could afford
to stay in their home under the set of circumstances above. The loan mod-
iﬁcations were part of the solution and would complement other efforts to
enable homeowners to reﬁnance into ﬁxed-rate loans, whether through the
FHA or through a private lender.
Through Hope Now, the Treasury pushed lenders and servicers to under-
take a calculation that balanced the cost (in net present value) of a modiﬁ-
cation that would keep a family in their home against the loss to the
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possible damage to the home, the resale consequences for a bank trying to
sell a foreclosed home in a declining market, and the fact that putting the
house up for sale would further depress home prices. When this net pre-
sent value calculation indicated that it made sense to modify the loan, the
Treasury—and Secretary Paulson personally—expected lenders to do so
to avoid foreclosure. The Treasury also pushed servicers to ensure that loan
modiﬁcations were of a long enough duration to give borrowers a chance
for the income growth and home price appreciation that would allow them
to reﬁnance permanently into a conforming ﬁxed-rate loan.
Although these modiﬁcations were in everyone’s best interest, they did
not appear to be taking place on the scale that would be expected. The
impact of second liens was one reason, since these make it difficult for
the servicer of the ﬁrst lien to get agreement on a modiﬁcation—and in the
case of piggyback second loans, it meant that the borrower was in much
worse ﬁnancial shape than would be indicated by the ﬁrst lien alone and
thus less likely to be able to sustain even a modiﬁed ﬁrst mortgage.
Addressing the frictions in the modiﬁcation process turned out to be an
ongoing project at the Treasury.
The goal, again, was a modiﬁcation that would lower the monthly pay-
ment to an amount that the borrower could afford. Some borrowers might
still walk away from their homes because they were deeply underwater,
while others would have such a severe mismatch between mortgage and
income that it made more sense from the point of view of the mortgage
owner to foreclose. Servicers would structure loan modiﬁcations to lower
an at-risk borrower’s monthly payment in the way that imposed the least
cost on the beneﬁcial owner of the mortgage. Given simple bond mathe-
matics, this meant that servicers would ﬁrst reduce the monthly payment
by extending the loan term out to 30 or 40 years; then, if necessary, lower
the payment further by cutting the interest rate; and only as a last resort
lower the principal (and then only if the contract governing the servicer
allowed for a principal reduction, which was not always the case).
If a homeowner could not sustain payments at the initial interest rate, the
view at the Treasury was that this person was probably in the wrong home.
The Treasury asked lenders to look at each situation, but we recognized
that, as Secretary Paulson put it, many such homeowners would become
renters.
The loan modiﬁcation approach thus focused on people with payment
and income problems, not on underwater borrowers. Since mortgages in
many states do not allow the lender recourse to claim a borrower’s assets
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water borrowers might walk away and allow foreclosure even if they could
afford their monthly payment. Not everyone would do so: a household
with a mortgage equal to 105 or 110 percent of their home value might
well stay if they could afford the monthly payment—they might like their
neighborhood or the local school, for example, or hope to see prices
rebound. But it was quite rational for a person who got into a home with
little or no equity and then suffered a 40 or 50 percent price decline to walk
away. Being underwater thus made a foreclosure more likely but was not a
sufﬁcient condition. The Treasury did not expect banks to modify loans
where borrowers could afford the payment but were balking at paying
because they were underwater—quite the opposite: Secretary Paulson’s
view was that a homeowner who could afford the mortgage but chose to
walk away was a speculator.
As a practical matter, servicers told us, reputational considerations
meant that they did not write down principal on a loan when the borrower
had the resources to pay—never. They would rather take the loss in fore-
closure when an underwater borrower walked away than set a precedent
for writing down principal, and then have to take multiple losses when
entire neighborhoods of homeowners asked for similar writedowns.
We also realized that the prospect of assistance could lead borrowers
who were not in difﬁculty to stop making payments in order to qualify for
easier terms. Such moral hazard is unavoidable, but one can choose the
screens and hurdles that borrowers must pass to qualify for a modiﬁcation.
The trade-off is that steps to limit moral hazard also limit take-up.
IV.C. The Debate over Subsidizing Foreclosure Avoidance
The Treasury expected lenders to go up to the line, making modiﬁcations
wherever the net present value calculation favored it. But there was no
public money on the table to get them to go further.
3 Even though we real-
ized that there was no appetite in Washington for crossing the line, Trea-
sury economists in October 2007 developed plans for two types of policies
to put public resources into foreclosure prevention.
The ﬁrst policy focused on underwater borrowers, with the federal gov-
ernment in effect writing checks in cases where lenders were willing to
take a write-down. The lender had to take a loss on the principal, after
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the modiﬁed loan—this could in effect be a substantial subsidy because
these would be loans to borrowers who were still quite risky. The borrower
would be required to pay part of the annual premium for the federal guar-
antee. This arrangement was broadly similar to the Hope for Homeowners
program later developed jointly by the Fed and congressional staff, but
with more realistic parameters for servicers and without the pretense that
no federal spending was involved. The plan was known at the Treasury as
the “GHA,” a reference both to its operation through a dramatic expansion
of the FHA in putting guarantees on mortgages to risky borrowers, and to
one of the main authors of the idea, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Micro-
economic Analysis Ted Gayer, who was at the Treasury for a year on leave
from Georgetown University’s Public Policy Institute.
The second type of policy focused on affordability and involved a
matching federal subsidy to lenders willing to lower interest rates in order
to reduce the monthly payments for at-risk borrowers.
4 The approach was
based on the bond math above that the most cost-affordable way to lower
monthly payments, after extending the term, was to cut the interest rate, and
on the straightforward notion that the government should pay lenders and
servicers to do what it wanted them to do. In this case the federal govern-
ment wanted them to lower interest rates to avoid foreclosures on at-risk
borrowers, and therefore it would give them a ﬁnancial incentive to do so
and no ﬁnancial incentive to put people into foreclosure. Lenders would
have to fund the ﬁrst 50 basis points of the interest rate reduction, to give
them an incentive to screen out marginal cases where they should just
modify the loan without any subsidy, after which the federal govern-
ment would pay half the cost of lowering the interest rate up to a total of
450 basis points; thus, the lender would fund a maximum of 250 basis
points and the federal government 200 basis points. Lenders could reduce
interest rates further on their own without an additional subsidy, but the
presumption was that a borrower who needed more than a 450-basis-point
reduction was in the wrong home. If a borrower defaulted after the modiﬁ-
cation, the federal subsidy would end—the government would pay for suc-
cess, not for failure. The subsidy would end after ﬁve years, long enough
of a breathing space for borrowers to have income growth and home price
appreciation and thus be in a position to reﬁnance into a ﬁxed-rate loan.
The trade-off involved in setting this time limit is clear: a longer subsidy
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home after the subsidy ends, but it means a more expensive modiﬁcation
for the lender and thus less uptake—fewer people would get into the pro-
gram, but more of those who did would be saved. We saw ﬁve years as
striking the right balance, and our analysis showed that several million
homeowners could avoid foreclosure with this interest rate subsidy.
The initial reaction to the proposed interest rate subsidy among Fed
staff responsible for analysis of housing policy in October 2007 was dis-
interest, because the plan did not address the problem of underwater bor-
rowers on which they were focused (as shown by the Hope for Homeowners
approach the Fed helped to develop). We agreed that the subsidy would not
be enough of an incentive to dissuade a deeply underwater borrower—
say, one with a loan of 150 percent of home value—from walking away.
But our view was that there was a government budget constraint (even if
many outside critics charged that the Bush administration did not act like
it), and it was not a wise use of public resources to write huge checks to
people who could afford their homes but might then choose not to stay in
them. This view, unlike the secretary’s assertion that a person who would
walk away was a speculator, was based on practical, not moral, grounds:
it would be better at the margin to use taxpayer dollars to hire more
preschool teachers, say, than to subsidize deeply underwater borrowers.
While the Fed staff was focused on underwater borrowers, within the
administration—among White House staff in particular, but also within the
Treasury—many were unwilling to put public money on the line to pre-
vent additional foreclosures, because any such program would inevitably
involve a bailout of some “irresponsible” homeowners. Put more cyni-
cally, spending public money on foreclosure avoidance would be asking
responsible taxpayers to subsidize people living in McMansions they could
not afford, with ﬂat-screen televisions paid for out of their home equity line
of credit. The policy rationale to spend public money is clear in that there
is a negative externality from foreclosures to home inventories and thus
prices. But the public opposition to such bailouts appeared to be intense—
ironically, many people were already angry at the Treasury for supposedly
bailing out irresponsible homeowners through Hope Now, even though
this did not involve explicit public spending.
Congress appeared to heed this opposition as well: there were constant
calls for the Treasury and the administration to do more on foreclosure pre-
vention, but this was just rhetoric. Until the FDIC came out with a proposal
late in 2008, there was no legislative support to spend public money to actu-
ally prevent foreclosures—the congressional proposal discussed below
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the TARP, even in the fall of 2008, Congress’ desire was for the Treasury
to spend TARP money for foreclosure avoidance. Members of Congress
did not want to have to vote speciﬁcally to spend money on this, suggest-
ing that they understood the poor optics of having the government write
checks when some would ﬁnd their way into the hands of “irresponsible
homeowners.”
In 2007 and through the middle of 2008, the focus of legislative energies
was on the so-called Frank-Dodd legislation, which became law on July 30,
2008, as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (which
included provisions to reform the GSEs). This proposal, named for its main
sponsors Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA) and Senator Christopher
Dodd (D-CT), involved FHA-guaranteed refinances of mortgages for
which lenders were willing to write down the loan principal to 87 percent
of the current market value. This was a great deal for the homeowner, who
would face lower payments and gain substantial equity (while having to
share some of these gains with the federal government on a future sale),
but a huge write-down for the lender, actually exceeding 13 percent in
instances where home prices had declined since origination. And there was
ostensibly no government money involved, as the legislation required the
GSEs to cover any costs—again demonstrating the reluctance of policy-
makers to be seen as writing checks to irresponsible homeowners. The Con-
gressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) estimated that the Frank-Dodd approach
would help some 400,000 homeowners. Having heard directly from lenders
about their reluctance to reduce loan principals, we saw the CBO estimate
as optimistic by 400,000. Because the bill included legislation to strengthen
the regulation of the GSEs, however, President Bush signed it into law.
Staff from the FHA, HUD, the Fed, the Treasury, and the FDIC made an
immense effort to implement the new Hope for Homeowners program—
and then unfortunately the Treasury’s estimate of participation turned out
to be correct, with few loans reﬁnanced through the middle of 2009.
As before, avoiding more foreclosures required someone—either the
government or lenders—to write a check. The attraction of the so-called
bankruptcy cramdown proposal, under which bankruptcy courts could
retroactively change mortgage contracts by reducing the loan principal, was
that it appeared to be “free”—which it was to the government—but only
because the cramdown would be a forced transfer from lenders to home-
owners. The Treasury opposed the cramdown proposal out of concern that
abrogating contracts in this way would have undesirable consequences for
the future availability of credit, especially to low-income borrowers. Some
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reduced, but future borrowers would ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to obtain a loan.
IV.D. The ASF Fast-Track Framework
With subsidies still off the table, what was done with respect to foreclo-
sure avoidance in late 2007 and into 2008 was that the Treasury and Hope
Now worked with the ASF to make modiﬁcations happen faster and more
frequently. This turned into the Streamlined Foreclosure and Loss Avoid-
ance Framework announced on December 6, 2007. This initiative focused
on approximately 1.8 million subprime ARMs with initial teaser rates set to
reset in 2008 and 2009. Servicers agreed to carry out a fast-track process to
help borrowers reﬁnance into a ﬁxed-rate loan (the ﬁrst choice for borrow-
ers with adequate income and credit history), or, failing this, to provide a
ﬁve-year extension of the initial rate for borrowers who could afford their
monthly payment at that rate. This would give borrowers time to experience
income gains and home appreciation that would put them in a position to
reﬁnance into a ﬁxed-rate loan in the future. A longer modiﬁcation than
ﬁve years would be more costly to a lender, and thus fewer modiﬁcations
would pass the cost test. And even a ﬁve-year horizon would be a change
from industry practice, which was geared to “repayment plans”—short-
term modifications appropriate for a borrower with a temporary income
problem of a few months. Industry participants estimated that about one-
third of the 1.8 million potential borrowers in the program could not afford
their starter rate, and another one-third could clearly receive either a reﬁ-
nancing or a rate freeze. The aim was to save as many as possible of the
remaining 600,000, so as to come close to helping 1.2 million homeown-
ers. The ASF fast-track framework provided servicers with a set of best
practices to implement modiﬁcations.
The streamlined framework was formally launched in early 2008, but
some servicers began to use it in late 2007. Hope Now reported a dramatic
increase in the number of homeowners receiving help in the form of a reﬁ-
nancing or a loan modiﬁcation, from about 300,000 per quarter in the ﬁrst
half of 2007 to over 500,000 per quarter in mid-2008 and nearly 700,000 in
the last three months of 2008. The increase was especially noticeable for
subprime borrowers, where the number of long-term modiﬁcations rose
from fewer than 50,000 per quarter in the ﬁrst nine months of 2007 to over
200,000 in the last quarter of 2008 alone. By the end of 2008, nearly half of
homeowners receiving help got long-term modiﬁcations rather than short-
term repayment plans, compared with fewer than 20 percent previously.
Hope Now was not solving the foreclosure problem, but it was performing
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ment of Hope Now.
The Treasury and Hope Now nonetheless faced continuing criticism
that these efforts were inadequate and that servicers were not doing
enough loan modiﬁcations. The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL),
for example, put out a widely cited report on January 30, 2008, claiming
that the “Paulson plan” for voluntary loan modiﬁcations would help only
3 percent of at-risk homes. What was not reported, however, was that the
3 percent ﬁgure was calculated using several unusual assumptions. First,
the denominator, the number of at-risk homes, included not just owner-
occupied homes but also investor properties, even though the ostensible
goal was to save homeowners, not investors. Second, the numerator—the
measure of success—included the loan modifications but not the refi-
nancings into ﬁxed-rate mortgages, which were usually better than a mod-
ification. Treasury economists who redid the analysis correcting these
questionable assumptions calculated that at least 30 percent, and possibly
more than half, of eligible homeowners would be helped by the Hope
Now framework. The CRL did not correct their analysis when we quietly
pointed out to them the ﬂaws (which their researchers acknowledged), but
neither did the Treasury go out proactively to the media to dispel the
misconception.
As criticisms continued that not enough was being done to prevent fore-
closures, the focus at Treasury turned to coming up with additional actions
through Hope Now that would show that more was being done. Out of this
came the February 12 announcement of “Project Lifeline,” under which
severely delinquent borrowers would be granted a 30-day pause on fore-
closure proceedings, as a last-ditch breathing space to allow borrowers to
work with their lender or servicer to ﬁnd a modiﬁcation that made sense
for both sides.
Some hurdles to modiﬁcations were difﬁcult to address. Servicers had
varying abilities to deal with the large number of modiﬁcation requests.
Also, as already noted, the presence of a second lien, such as a home equity
line of credit or a piggyback mortgage, could present a challenge to a mod-
iﬁcation on the primary mortgage, since owners of second liens had an
incentive to hold up the process unless they received a payoff—this even
though a second lien on a troubled borrower was worth only pennies on the
dollar, since the primary mortgage holder would have the ﬁrst right to the
proceeds of a foreclosure sale.
Legal and accounting issues constituted two further hurdles to loan
modiﬁcations. Servicers were unclear as to their legal ability to modify
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many modiﬁcations would lead to an adverse change in the accounting
treatment of the MBSs containing the loans. Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board statement number 140 provides guidance on whether a trans-
fer of assets to a securitization trust can receive off-balance-sheet treatment.
The concern was that if too many loans were modiﬁed, this would make
the trust no longer a passive structure and therefore ineligible for off-
balance-sheet treatment. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox indicated that
having loans in an MBS trust receive the ﬁve-year rate freeze did not pre-
clude continued off-balance-sheet treatment so long as it was “reasonably
foreseeable” that the loans being modiﬁed were otherwise headed for
default. Treasury economists worked with FDIC staff to analyze loan-level
data on subprime mortgages. The results showed that for subprime bor-
rowers in the years covered by the Hope Now streamlined approach, it was
sadly straightforward to conclude that a default was reasonably foresee-
able. These results went into a letter from the Treasury to the SEC that
was meant to provide backing for Chairman Cox. The view at the Trea-
sury was then that servicers had the legal authority they needed to mod-
ify loans, and that there was no need for congressional proposals to enact
a “safe harbor” that would explicitly provide such cover. Although we
realized that the safe harbor provision might have avoided some law-
suits against servicers who modified loans, our concern was that it was
a retroactive change to contracts—not as obviously harmful as the mort-
gage cramdown proposal, but harmful nonetheless in suggesting to
lenders that they should henceforth worry about retroactive changes to
contracts.
It turned out that the original motivation for the Hope Now streamlined
modiﬁcation protocol was incorrect, in that interest rate resets by them-
selves were not the fundamental driver of rising foreclosures—a point doc-
umented by Mark Schweitzer and Guhan Venkatu (2009). This can be
inferred from ﬁgure 1, since the foreclosure rate does not have an upward
kink at the typical reset point at month 24. Many subprime ARMs started
at an initial rate of 8 to 9 percent for two years and then were scheduled to
reset to 600 basis points above the six-month LIBOR (the London inter-
bank offered rate). By early 2008, however, LIBOR had fallen to 3 per-
cent or less, so that the step-up in the interest rates and thus the payment
shock were fairly modest. We nonetheless saw the ASF streamlined mod-
iﬁcation framework as useful, since it would be ready in case interest
rates rose in the future, and it was driving modiﬁcations for loans even
before resets.
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Treasury housing policy by early 2008 had four goals:
—avoiding preventable foreclosures as discussed above;
—ensuring the continued ﬂow of capital into housing markets, both
through efforts to enact reform of the GSEs and by resisting proposals,
such as the bankruptcy cramdown, that would have reduced the availabil-
ity of capital for housing ﬁnance;
—enabling the necessary housing correction to proceed, which meant
warding off proposals for long-lasting foreclosure moratoriums, which
we saw as simply prolonging the difﬁculty without providing lasting help
for at-risk homeowners; and
—supporting the broad economy, such as through the January 2008
stimulus.
With little desire on anyone’s part to put public money on the table, hous-
ing policy was to remain largely focused around the debate over modiﬁca-
tions achieved through Hope Now, and over the Frank-Dodd legislation.
A recurring theme of policy proposals from outside the Treasury was
that the Treasury should promote shared-appreciation mortgages, in which
homeowners would get a loan modiﬁcation or ﬁnancing concessions in
exchange for giving up part of the home’s future appreciation to the lender.
We studied this proposal, which amounted to a debt-for-equity swap, but
concluded that this type of mortgage was not already common because
there was little demand for it.
The one truly new proposal we heard in early 2008 was that of Martin
Feldstein, who in a March 7 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (“How to
Stop the Mortgage Crisis,” p. A15) and in subsequent writings proposed
stabilizing the housing market by offering all homeowners a government
loan that would be used to reduce the principal on ﬁrst-lien mortgages.
Such a loan would make it less likely that homeowners would have nega-
tive mortgage equity and thereby reduce future defaults in the face of con-
tinued home price declines. Participating homeowners would not be able
to walk away from the government loan, because it would be a tax lien that
could not be escaped in bankruptcy. The Feldstein proposal would not help
borrowers already facing foreclosure, but that was not the point—it was
meant to arrest the impact of future potential underwater borrowers walk-
ing away from their homes and adding to inventories, thus intensifying
the downward momentum of home prices. Intrigued, we analyzed the
potential impacts, including looking at the Internal Revenue Service’s
record in collecting on tax liens to get a sense of the budget cost. In the
end, however, with little political support for spending money on risky
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aimed at the better-off homeowners who were not in imminent danger.
Housing policy was to stay essentially static until later in 2008, when
the $700 billion TARP fund became available and calls grew to spend part
of it on foreclosure prevention. In the fall of 2008, the FDIC developed
two initiatives aimed at foreclosure avoidance. The ﬁrst was a roadmap for
servicers to follow in modifying loans—a “mod in a box” as they called
it—detailing the calculations needed to implement the net present value
calculation comparing the costs of foreclosure with those of loan modiﬁca-
tion. This was based on the FDIC’s experience with IndyMac, the Los
Angeles-area savings and loan that the agency had taken over on July 11.
The IndyMac protocol involved steps to bring a borrower’s monthly
payment on his or her first mortgage down to 38 percent of pre-tax
income (a ﬁgure that the FDIC changed to 31 percent when it found that
many borrowers could not stay current at the 38 percent level). The steps
were familiar from the bond math above: there was no principal write-
down but instead a term extension, interest rate cuts, and principal forbear-
ance, all aimed at lowering monthly payments. The FDIC approach looked
only at the monthly payment as a share of the ﬁrst mortgage—the so-called
front end ratio—and not at total loan payments (the so-called back-end
ratio) including a second lien, if present, and any auto loans and credit
card bills. This focus on the front end was done for speed; the idea was to
allow for rapid modiﬁcation of loans, accepting that some might well go
bad, since a borrower with loaded-up credit cards might ultimately still
default even if the interest rate on the home loan was reduced. This
approach to modiﬁcations was a natural extension of the streamlined pro-
tocol developed in late 2007 through the auspices of Hope Now, although
the media did not make this connection and the Treasury did not press it
(that is, the Treasury did not pro-actively note that the Hope Now activities
that so many people had criticized had provided the groundwork for the
widely acclaimed FDIC approach). The GSEs later adopted much of the
approach of the IndyMac protocol in putting out their own streamlined
approach to modiﬁcations on November 11, 2008.
The second FDIC proposal for foreclosure avoidance was a loss-sharing
insurance plan, under which the federal government would make good on
half of the loss suffered by a lender that modiﬁed a loan according to the
IndyMac protocol but later saw the loan go into default and foreclosure.
This was an innovative margin on which to push: there was a great deal of
anecdotal evidence, later conﬁrmed by statistical evidence from the Ofﬁce
of the Comptroller of the Currency, that many loans were going bad even
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vided some comfort to a lender for making the modiﬁcation, since the
lender would be reimbursed for half of the loss if the borrower eventually
defaulted. Housing activist groups such as the Center for Responsible
Lending endorsed the FDIC plan, as did Elizabeth Warren, the Harvard
law professor appointed by Congress to chair an oversight panel for the
TARP. The proposal received a good deal of coverage in the press, some
of which confused the loss-sharing insurance proposal with the IndyMac
protocol, even though the latter involved no government resources.
At the Treasury, we noted that the FDIC plan gave rise to new forms of
both adverse selection and moral hazard in ways that made it mainly a
windfall for the beneﬁcial owners of mortgages rather than a beneﬁt for
homeowners. In other words, American taxpayers would be providing a
subsidy to banks, hedge funds, and other owners of MBSs (including for-
eign banks and foreign hedge funds) rather than to American families.
Under the FDIC proposal, if a servicer modiﬁed a loan and the borrower
was able to stay in the home as a result, the owner of the mortgage got
nothing from the government.
5 If, however, a loan was modiﬁed according
to the FDIC’s protocol and it went bad, the government would write a
large check to the mortgage owner. Moreover, there was no deductible on
this loss-sharing insurance coverage, so in the case of an underwater bor-
rower, the government would have in effect been providing ﬁre insurance
on an entire house when several of the rooms were already engulfed in
ﬂames. At the Treasury, we viewed the loss-sharing insurance proposal as
a nontransparent way to funnel money to institutions that had made bad
lending decisions and to investors who had bought the loans—a hidden
bailout. Ironically, however, the New York Times on November 1, 2008,
published an article by columnist Joe Nocera asserting that the Treasury
opposed the FDIC proposal because “aid is going to homeowners, not
giant ﬁnancial institutions.”
6
The confusion in the New York Times column might have reﬂected a
common difﬁculty in understanding the impacts of insurance proposals,
since the costs are implicit at the start whereas the payouts are yet to be real-
ized, and thus the subsidy is somewhat obscured. In this case, big checks
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6. Joe Nocera, “A Rescue Hindered by Politics,” New York Times, November 1, 2008,
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down the road as the modiﬁed loans defaulted. In contrast, the interest rate
subsidy puts the government resources to avoid foreclosure in clear day-
light—it looks exactly like what it is, which is writing checks to people
who are in homes they cannot afford. The cost per incremental foreclosure
avoided, however, is much less with the interest rate subsidy. In short, this
proposal is more efﬁcient but suffers from its transparency.
In evaluating the FDIC proposal, Treasury economists suggested that a
way to remove some of the unwanted windfall for lenders was to have the
insurance payout reﬂect any decline in the area home price index after the
loan modiﬁcation, rather than the lender’s loss from foreclosure. Setting
the payout in this way would cover the valid concern that declining home
prices gave servicers an incentive to foreclose sooner rather than give a
risky borrower another chance. Although the FDIC declined to incorporate
this suggestion, the Obama administration eventually made it part of its
February 2009 foreclosure avoidance proposal. A related proposal by
Treasury economist Steven Sharpe (a Fed staffer who came to Treasury for
several months to help with capital markets and housing proposals) was
for the federal government to sell insurance against price declines to home
purchasers. At closing, buyers could pay a fee and receive insurance that
compensated them ﬁve years later for any decline in overall home prices in
their area—homeowners would receive the payout, if any, without having
to sell their home. The idea was to boost housing demand going forward
by removing the fear among potential homebuyers of “catching a falling
knife”—that is, buying a home that would continue to lose value and leave
them underwater.
The adverse selection in the FDIC loss-sharing proposal came about
because lenders would naturally want to put into the program those loans
that were most likely to default, so that the government would cover half
of any loss. At the suggestion of the Fed, the FDIC included a six-month
waiting period, which meant that the lender would have to bear the cost of
modifying the loan for six months. The moral hazard came about because
the lender would have a ﬁnancial incentive to foreclose immediately after
the six-month waiting period. Under the FDIC proposal, lenders would
qualify for this loss-sharing insurance coverage only if they agreed to
apply the IndyMac modiﬁcation protocol to all loans in their portfolio—
lenders could not choose to include, for example, only the loans of bor-
rowers that they knew had huge credit card debts. But this did not change
the fundamental incentives; it just meant that lenders would participate in
the program only if the expected value of the insurance windfall they
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would be required to fund.
Both the interest rate subsidy developed at the Treasury and the FDIC’s
loss-sharing insurance proposal focused on affordability rather than on
underwater borrowers; we saw this as entirely appropriate from the point
of view of the allocation of government resources. But the incentive effects
of the two proposals were clearly different, since the interest rate subsidy
would be paid only when foreclosure was avoided, whereas the loss-sharing
insurance by its nature would pay out when foreclosure occurred. Even
Elizabeth Warren conceded to Treasury staff that she understood that banks
rather than homeowners would beneﬁt more from the FDIC plan. She was
evidently supporting the FDIC proposal in public because she thought
something had to be done about foreclosures, and the FDIC plan seemed to
be the only one on the table. The American Bankers Association endorsed
the FDIC plan as well; presumably this reﬂected their understanding of its
impact.
V. The Stimulus of 2008
By October 2007 there were increasing signs that the economy would
remain weak into 2008 and that there was considerable downside risk from
the housing and financial markets. Work began in earnest on fiscal pol-
icy options to support growth. The idea that such action might be needed
was buttressed by public calls for it by prominent economists, notably
Lawrence Summers and Martin Feldstein. Throughout November and
December, the administration’s economic team—the Treasury, the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers (CEA), the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget,
and the National Economic Council—considered various approaches,
focusing on tax cuts for households and businesses. In the end, the Eco-
nomic Stimulus Act of 2008 contained mainly tax cuts, along with an
extension of unemployment insurance benefits. The form of the tax 
cuts was remarkably similar to what CEA Chairman Edward Lazear had
sketched out as an initial proposal: rebate checks implemented as a reduc-
tion of the lowest individual income tax rate, and thus mainly an infra-
marginal tax cut, along with additional expensing and bonus depreciation
for businesses. Sending a one-time check to households was not the admin-
istration’s ﬁrst choice—the view was that a longer-lasting policy would
have more impact. But there was no political prospect of a permanent tax
cut or extending the administration’s 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. This was
about tactics—supporting the broad economy while housing and credit
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term growth.
The stimulus was proposed in early January and signed into law in mid-
February, speeded by the administration’s stipulation that it would not
ﬁght for “Bush-style” tax policy and what seemed to be a determination by
the congressional leadership to get this done quickly after an initial year in
power with only modest accomplishments. The details of the tax provi-
sions were agreed with the House leadership late one evening, when only
that very morning the Treasury legislative affairs staff had reported that it
could be weeks before a compromise was reached.
The Internal Revenue Service and the Financial Management Service
within the Treasury worked wonders to push out nearly $100 billion in
rebate checks and electronic payments, with most of the cash going out the
door from April 28 to July 11, 2008. We at the Treasury, at least, expected
the main impact of the stimulus to come from the rebate checks rather than
the expensing provision; with the economy weakening, it was hard to see
much stimulus to business investment from a tax incentive that amounted
to the time value of money. Our expectation was that about 30 percent
would be spent in the second and third quarters, rising to 40 percent by the
end of 2008. Assuming a modest second-round multiplier, we tallied up a
boost of $50 billion to aggregate demand. With each job created or pre-
served corresponding to about $100,000 of income in the national accounts,
a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggested a boost of 500,000 jobs.
Simulations using the private sector Macroeconomic Advisers model sug-
gested roughly the same impact on employment.
In retrospect, the stimulus appears to have been the right thing for the
wrong reason in that the rebate checks effectively served to offset the drag
from higher energy prices. Looking back in January 2009, we calculated
that higher energy prices in mid-2008 had meant an unexpected hit to U.S.
consumers of about $40 billion—close to the additional spending we had
expected from the stimulus. Others have disagreed, claiming that the stim-
ulus was simply ineffective. This remains an important topic for future
research. The higher energy prices hit at precisely the wrong time, causing
a downdraft to spending just as the labor market was ﬁnally feeling the
impact of slower-than-potential GDP growth in the latter part of 2007.
VI. Bear Stearns and Plans to Break the Glass
The collapse of Bear Stearns over the weekend of March 14, 2008, was a
watershed event for the Treasury. Until that point the Treasury had urged
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losses but had not contemplated ﬁscal actions aimed directly at the ﬁnan-
cial sector. Instead, the main policy levers were seen as being the purview
of the Fed, which had cut interest rates and developed new lending facili-
ties in the face of events. From the Treasury side, the deliberations of that
weekend were handled directly by Secretary Paulson working the phones
from his home; meanwhile the Fed provided J. P. Morgan with ﬁnancing
to purchase Bear Stearns. Moral hazard was a huge concern, but the feeling
at the Treasury was that even when the Bear Stearns transaction was rene-
gotiated up from $2 per share to $10, the loss of wealth was still large
enough to give pause to market participants and thus mitigate the moral
hazard. Of course, moral hazard derived more broadly from the fact that
Bear Stearns’ bondholders and counterparties avoided a loss. But the Trea-
sury and the Fed saw little alternative to rescuing the ﬁrm at that time (or at
least cushioning its fall), simply because the speed of its collapse left mar-
kets unprepared.
A number of lessons of that weekend have received extensive discus-
sion in the ﬁnancial press and in the academic literature, including the role
of liquidity (as discussed by Allen and Carletti 2008), the fragilities arising
from counterparty risks embedded in the three-party repo system and the
over-the-counter derivative markets, and the need for a resolution mecha-
nism for troubled nonbank ﬁnancial institutions. At the Treasury, two
additional lessons were learned: ﬁrst, we had better get to work on contin-
gency plans in case things got worse, and second, many in Washington did
not understand the implications of nonrecourse lending from the Fed. The
second lesson was somewhat fortuitous, in that it took some time before
the political class realized that the Fed had not just lent J. P. Morgan
money to buy Bear Stearns, but in effect now owned the downside of a
portfolio of $29 billion of possibly dodgy assets. This discovery of the lack
of transparency of nonrecourse lending by the Fed was to ﬁgure promi-
nently in later ﬁnancial rescue plans.
The Fed’s March 17 announcement that it would provide loans to broker-
dealers through the new Primary Dealer Credit Facility seemed to us and
many Wall Street economists to remove the risk of another large ﬁnancial
institution suffering a sudden and catastrophic collapse as a result of a liq-
uidity crisis. This provided some time to plan for further events.
Part of the planning was for the long term. On March 31, 2008, the Trea-
sury released its Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Struc-
ture, with a vision for a long-term reshaping of ﬁnancial sector regulation.
This plan had long been in the works; indeed, Treasury had requested pub-
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Blueprint’s release led to press reports that this was the Treasury’s
“response” to the crisis.
More near term in vision was work being done on so-called break-the-
glass options—what to do in case of another major emergency. This work
evolved from a recurring theme of input from market participants, which
was that the solution to the ﬁnancial crisis was for the Treasury to buy up
the toxic assets on bank balance sheets. Eventually Neel Kashkari and I
wrote a memo listing options for dealing with a ﬁnancial sector crisis aris-
ing from an undercapitalized system. The memo went through more than a
dozen iterations in discussions around the Treasury and with Fed headquar-
ters and the New York Federal Reserve Bank between March and April.
The options were fourfold: buy the toxic assets, turn the Treasury into a
monoline insurer and insure the assets, directly buy stakes in banks to
inject capital, or reﬁnance risky mortgages into government-guaranteed
loans and thus improve asset performance and ﬁrms’ capital positions
from the bottom up. With estimates such as that of David Greenlaw and
others (2008) in mind that U.S. ﬁnancial institutions would suffer $250 bil-
lion of losses from mortgage securities, we envisioned a government fund
of $500 billion. A mix of asset purchases, capital injections, and additional
private capital raising by banks would allow this amount to roughly offset
the expected losses.
These options would move the focus of ﬁnancial markets policy back
from the Fed to the Treasury, which would be appropriate in that the prob-
lem reﬂected inadequate capital rather than insufﬁcient liquidity. But these
actions all required congressional action, and there was no prospect of get-
ting approval for any of this. With economic growth positive and the stim-
ulus rebates only just beginning to go out in late April, it was unimaginable
that Congress would give the Treasury secretary such a fund. And it was
doubly unimaginable that the fund could be enacted without immediately
being put to use. Such a massive intervention in ﬁnancial markets could 
be proposed only if Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke went to
Congress and announced that the ﬁnancial system and the economy were
on the verge of collapse. By then it could well be too late.
For several months in the second quarter of 2008, things seemed to be
improving. The housing adjustment appeared to be proceeding. Prices con-
tinued to fall and construction and sales were still in decline, but the rate of
descent appeared to be slowing, and our view was that by the end of 2008
housing would no longer be subtracting from GDP. The second half of
2008 looked to be difﬁcult, but we expected the rebate checks to support
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and growth rebounded in 2009.
VII. Rescuing the GSEs
The relative quiet was to hold until early summer, when the effects of the
housing collapse manifested themselves in the collapse of IndyMac and
severe pressures on the GSEs, in the form of declining stock prices and
widening spreads on Fannie and Freddie securities, and thus on mortgage
interest rates for potential homebuyers. The FDIC took over IndyMac and
turned the ﬁrm into a laboratory for its foreclosure prevention ideas, but
the problems of the GSEs fell squarely in the Treasury’s court. The Trea-
sury was in a difﬁcult position. GSE debt and MBSs with GSE guarantees
were held throughout the ﬁnancial system, and a failure of the ﬁrms would
have meant chaos in financial markets. As commentators such as Peter
Wallison of the American Enterprise Institute had long warned, (see, for
example, Wallison, Stanton, and Ely 2004), the GSEs were holding the
ﬁnancial system and taxpayers hostage—and in mid-July 2008 it seemed
they would win the standoff.
The options were all unpleasant, and all required congressional action:
to provide the GSEs with more liquidity by raising their line of credit with
the Treasury from $2.25 billion each to something much larger; to inject
capital; or to ask Congress to put the two ﬁrms into conservatorship, with
the government running the companies on behalf of their shareholders
(which would eventually be mainly the government). This last option
could be done under existing legislative authority but still required con-
gressional approval, and the GSEs could have fought this and might well
have won, since their regulator had said as recently as July that the two
firms were adequately capitalized. (This statement referred to statutory
deﬁnitions of capital, which included tax assets that could only be mone-
tized in the future when the ﬁrms became proﬁtable again, but it nonethe-
less carried weight.) Moreover, even putting the GSEs into conservatorship
raised questions about whether their $5 trillion in liabilities would be
added to the public balance sheet. This did not seem to Treasury econo-
mists to be a meaningful issue, since the liabilities had always been implic-
itly on the balance sheet—and in any case were matched by about the same
amount of assets. But the prospect that rating agencies might respond by
downgrading U.S. sovereign debt was unappealing. A fourth option,
receivership, would involve liquidating the companies and was deemed off
the table because it would have required winding down the GSE portfolios.
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GSEs’ activities, but the GSEs’ purchases of MBSs were important for
ensuring the availability of ﬁnancing to potential homebuyers. Addressing
the portfolios would have to wait for a longer-term reform.
In the end, Secretary Paulson went to the steps of the Treasury building
on Sunday, July 13, and proposed “all of the above”: the power to give the
GSEs both liquidity and capital in amounts that would make clear to mar-
ket participants that the U.S. government stood behind the obligations of
these companies. He asked Congress to raise the GSEs’ lines of credit; to
authorize unlimited (subject to the statutory debt ceiling) direct Treasury
purchases of GSE securities, including both their MBSs and their common
stock, through the end of 2009, to ensure that the ﬁrms could fulﬁll their
missions with respect to housing markets; and to give their regulator,
OFHEO, the power of conservatorship and other authorities that the
administration had long sought. The Treasury would insist on terms and
conditions to protect the taxpayer if public money were ever put into the
ﬁrms. These powers were requested with the idea that the ﬁrms’ liquidity
crunch reﬂected a lack of market conﬁdence that a show of Treasury sup-
port could assuage—that standing behind the ﬁrms would calm market
fears and avoid the need for a bailout. (The secretary’s unfortunate phras-
ing, at a July 15 congressional hearing, about having a “bazooka” in terms
of the ﬁnancial ability to stand behind the ﬁrms was to be repeated con-
stantly in the media in the months to come.)
The Fed authorized bridge lending to Fannie and Freddie while Con-
gress worked on the legislation, which was enacted on July 30, 2008 (and
which included the Hope for Homeowners program). Some market partic-
ipants complained that the rescue did not distinguish between senior and
subordinated debt but instead made both of them whole, whereas many
participants had expected the subordinated debt not to be included within
the rubric of a guarantee. However, the view at the Treasury was that sim-
plicity and clarity were paramount (although, of course, clarity is some-
times in the eye of the beholder).
This effective hardening of the heretofore-implicit guarantee of the
GSEs left mixed feelings among Treasury staff. A crisis had been fore-
stalled with a ﬂurry of weekend activity (soon to become a regular part of
the Treasury workweek), but the outcome seemed to cement in place the
awkward status of the GSEs and their ability to privatize gains and
socialize risk by borrowing at advantageous terms under the shelter of a
now-explicit government guarantee. Past Treasury departments across
administrations had sought to remove the implicit guarantee, not to harden
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to honor Martin Feldstein, outgoing president of the National Bureau of
Economic Research, many people expressed to me directly their misgiv-
ings about what looked like a bailout, in which GSE bondholders and
shareholders won and taxpayers lost. It was hard to disagree.
It turned out that Secretary Paulson had the same misgivings. The fol-
lowing Monday, July 28, he instructed Treasury staff to analyze the capital
situations of the GSEs. To protect taxpayers in the case that an actual
investment was needed in the future, he wanted to know ﬁrst if these ﬁrms
were solvent. The Treasury’s Ofﬁce of Domestic Finance engaged a top-
notch team from Morgan Stanley to dig into Fannie and Freddie’s books
and assess their ﬁnancial condition. While this was happening, it became
apparent that the July 13 announcement and subsequent legislation had left
markets uncertain about the status of the enterprises. The GSEs had
access to private sector debt funding, although with increased costs, as the
spreads on ﬁve-year Fannie benchmark agency debt above Treasuries rose
from about 65 basis points in early June to 94 basis points on September 5,
just before the ﬁrms were put into conservatorship. But the common stocks
of the two ﬁrms continued to decline. Market participants were in effect
saying that they (mostly) believed that the government stood behind the
debt and guarantees on the MBSs, but were not conﬁdent that the ﬁrms
were solvent. This was not Secretary Paulson’s intent—he did not deliber-
ately set up the GSEs to fail and get them into conservatorship. The weeks
in July and August were tense ones within the Treasury, as markets deteri-
orated while waiting for more clarity on Fannie and Freddie. It looked to
market participants as if there was no guidance, but this was because we
were busy working—and Secretary Paulson was willing to suffer for a few
weeks in order to have his next step come out right.
The Morgan Stanley team came back several weeks later in August with
a bleak analysis: both Fannie and Freddie looked to be deeply insolvent,
with Freddie the worse of the two. In light of the ﬁrms’ well-publicized
accounting irregularities of previous years, Treasury staff were especially
amazed that the GSEs appeared to have made accounting decisions that
obscured their problems. With receivership still an undesirable outcome
because it would imply prematurely winding down the retained portfolio,
the Treasury worked with the GSEs’ regulator (formerly OFHEO, the July
legislation having merged it with the Federal Housing Finance Board to
create the Federal Housing Finance Agency, or FHFA) to set out an air-
tight case of insolvency that warranted putting the ﬁrms into conservator-
ship. The July legislation allowed FHFA to do this without consulting
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rapidly. Even though the analysis from Morgan Stanley was clear, it took
some time to bring the FHFA examiners on board—it seemed difﬁcult for
them to acknowledge that the ﬁrms they had long overseen had gone so
wrong, and it would have been awkward for the head of FHFA to decide
on the conservatorship over the objection of his senior career staff. It was
also necessary to convince the management of Fannie and Freddie to
acquiesce without a legal ﬁght. There was no expectation of a problem
with Freddie’s management—the CEO had publicly expressed his fatigue
with the whole situation—but Fannie appeared then to be in somewhat bet-
ter ﬁnancial shape and might reasonably have expected to be treated dif-
ferently than Freddie. Ultimately, Secretary Paulson had a trump card: he
could say in public that he could not in good conscience invest taxpayer
money in these firms, and that would doubtless spark their demise. But in
the end he did not have to play this card. In well-publicized meetings
with Secretary Paulson, Chairman Bernanke, and FHFA Director James
Lockhart, both ﬁrms acceded to conservatorship, which was announced on
Sunday, September 7, 2008.
The Treasury announced three measures jointly with the conservator-
ship decision: so-called keepwells, under which the Treasury committed to
inject up to $100 billion of capital each into Fannie and Freddie as needed
to ensure their positive net worth; a Treasury lending facility if needed;
and a program under which the Treasury would purchase the GSEs’ MBSs
in the open market. This last program was mainly symbolic—a demonstra-
tion by the Treasury that the obligations of the GSEs were “good enough
for us” and should be seen as secure by the rest of the world. The U.S. gov-
ernment ended up as 79.9 percent owner of the GSEs, receiving preferred
stock on terms that essentially crushed the existing shareholders. (The pre-
cise level of ownership was chosen in light of accounting rules that would
have brought GSE assets and liabilities onto the government balance sheet
at 80 percent ownership.)
The real action here was the two $100 billion keepwells, which were
meant to effectuate the now-explicit guarantee of GSE debt and MBS
coverage—they would provide just-in-time capital injections as losses were
realized and ensure that Fannie and Freddie had the ﬁnancial ability to ser-
vice their debt and insurance obligations. The Treasury could not by law
make GSE debts full-faith-and-credit obligations of the U.S. government—
this could only happen through an act of Congress that changed the GSE
charters. Unfortunately, the keepwells were not well explained by the Trea-
sury, and it took some time for market participants to understand that they
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whether $100 billion was enough to cover possible losses at either ﬁrm. As
with many decisions made quickly at the Treasury in this period, the ﬁgure
of $100 billion did not receive considered discussion across the building
and was eventually revised upward by the Obama administration.
The conservatorship arrangement left unanswered the question of the
long-term status of Fannie and Freddie. This was by necessity, since any
such decision required congressional action to amend the ﬁrms’ charters.
An unfortunate consequence, however, was that borrowing costs for the
GSEs remained above those for Treasury debt. Even though the public bal-
ance sheet was effectively behind the ﬁrms, this could change in the future,
and the spread over Treasuries seemed to reﬂect this uncertainty. The con-
fusion over what the Treasury could and could not do was evident in the
writings of outside observers. In his blog on November 25, 2008, for exam-
ple, New York Times columnist Paul Krugman wrote, “the Bush administra-
tion, weirdly, has refused to declare that GSE debt is backed by the full
faith and credit of the US government.” Krugman wondered whether this
reﬂected politics. No politics were involved: the Treasury did not do this
because it was not legal. Although the criticism of the Bush administration
was off target, the Treasury had not explained the situation clearly.
The long-term status of the GSEs remains at this writing to be decided
by Congress. Each of the GSEs before conservatorship could be thought of
as two related entities under one roof: a securitizer and monoline insurer
that packaged and guaranteed mortgages with relatively good underwriting
standards, and a hedge fund that leveraged the funding advantage from its
implicit guarantee. Their retained portfolios were the embodiment of this
positive carry and the source of the systemic risk, since scaling up the bal-
ance sheet with MBS purchases had driven the GSEs’ massive borrowing.
It was clear that the desired long-term outcome for the GSEs was to wind
down the portfolios. Indeed, the agreements struck at the time of the con-
servatorship explicitly committed the ﬁrms to do so over time, starting in
2010. In the meantime, however, the portfolios were a tool with which to
support the housing market, and the Treasury wanted there to be upward
room for more MBS purchases so that homebuyers would not face higher
interest rates. As a result, Treasury ofﬁcials, including the secretary, did
not talk directly about winding down the portfolios, out of fear that this
would ﬂuster markets and cause a spike in interest rates paid by the GSEs.
This tension was not resolved until later in the year, with the November 25,
2008, announcement by the Fed that it would fund the GSEs directly by
purchasing their debt and MBSs.
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Secretary Paulson spoke publicly on this topic in early January 2009. He
favored turning the GSEs into a utility-like company, with private share-
holders but government regulation. This preference seemed to be driven by
a view that there would be substantial waste from the duplication involved
with multiple GSEs, which was an approach favored by some at the Fed. A
possible alternative would combine the two, with one or two GSEs running
the automated networks by which banks originating mortgages sold con-
forming loans to the GSEs, and then a multitude of ﬁnancial institutions
competing with each other to securitize those loans into MBSs that would
receive a government-backed guarantee. Such a restructuring would be
along the lines of the present credit card market, which consists of a few
large networks such as Visa and MasterCard but many credit card issuers
in ﬁerce competition.
The agreements struck with the GSEs took one small step in the direc-
tion of fostering future competition, in that the companies would have to
pay a fee to the government for the explicit backing of the securities they
issued starting in 2009. The details remain to be determined, but one could
imagine over time allowing banks to pay such a fee and receive government
backing on their securitizations of conforming loans. This would allow
entry, which, one hopes, would drive innovation for the beneﬁt of Ameri-
can homebuyers. Eventually the GSEs could become boutique ﬁnancial
ﬁrms rather than behemoths, or they might even one day acquire banks and
become normal ﬁnancial services ﬁrms. All of this, however, is for the
future.
VIII. “Free Market Day”: Lehman Brothers and AIG
The way Congressman Barney Frank put it at a hearing at which I testiﬁed
on Wednesday, September 17, was that we should celebrate the previous
Monday, September 15, as “Free Market Day,” because on that day
Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail and the free market to work. On the
16th, however, AIG had been bailed out, so, Chairman Frank continued,
“the national commitment to the free market lasted one day,” but we should
celebrate that day.
7
The decision not to save Lehman Brothers is perhaps the most hotly
debated decision of the entire crisis. Secretary Paulson and Chairman
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had no authority to save it: the Treasury had no such authority whatsoever,
whereas the Fed could provide liquidity but not capital. The Fed can, how-
ever, lend against collateral to its satisfaction, and so in principle it could
have lent against Lehman’s unencumbered assets—essentially what it did
with AIG. This would not have saved Lehman—indeed, it would have
concentrated losses on the rest of the ﬁrm—but it might have provided
time for a more orderly dissolution. Indeed, there are estimates that the dis-
orderly bankruptcy reduced the recovery value of the ﬁrm by billions of
dollars. The view at Treasury, however, was that Lehman’s management
had been given abundant time to resolve their situation by raising addi-
tional capital or selling off the ﬁrm, and market participants were aware of
this and had time to prepare. In the end there was no one prepared to buy
Lehman with any realistic amount of government assistance as had been
the case with Bear Stearns.
On Monday, September 15, it did not look like the outcome of Lehman’s
bankruptcy would be the start of the third and most difﬁcult phase of the
crisis (the ﬁrst being from August 2007 to the collapse of Bear Stearns).
What we did not realize would occur next were two things: the breaking of
the buck by the Reserve Fund, and the reaction of foreign investors to the
failure of Lehman. It is hard to see how the Treasury could have antici-
pated that the Reserve Fund money market mutual fund would incur such
heavy losses from Lehman commercial paper and medium-term notes that
it would break the buck, with its net asset value slipping below par. We
might have better anticipated, however, that foreign investors were not
prepared for Lehman to collapse—after all, there is an evident gulf in the
understanding of policy actions even in moving from Washington to New
York or Boston; this deﬁcit of clarity grows only more severe across bor-
ders and oceans. Together these events led to a run on money market
mutual funds, which in turn caused commercial paper markets to freeze up.
If left unstopped, this would have led issuers of commercial paper to turn
to their backup lines of credit—meaning that banks would have needed to
massively fund these lines simultaneously under circumstances they had
never contemplated, and then hoard capital against those lines. As dis-
cussed by Victoria Ivashina and David Scharfstein (2008), banks in the fall
of 2008 did fund these lines as companies drew on them as a precautionary
measure, but this played out over time rather than all at once.
From the Treasury’s perspective, all this looked like a broad run on the
ﬁnancial system. The panic in the money market mutual funds led investors
to pull out roughly $200 billion net from these vehicles from September 5
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009
11641-01a_Swagel_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:45 PM  Page 40to 19—more than 7 percent of assets in the funds. In the face of these large-
scale redemptions, money market mutual fund companies began to hoard
cash rather than invest in wholesale funding instruments such as commer-
cial paper, repo agreements, and certiﬁcates of deposit. As the wholesale
funding market dried up, broker-dealers began cutting their credit lines to
clients such as hedge funds and other counterparties. This in turn threat-
ened to lead to ﬁre sales of assets and a disorderly deleveraging, with
potentially catastrophic consequences across the entire ﬁnancial system.
The focus at the Treasury and the Fed was on the commercial paper
market. As the three-month Treasury rate fell nearly to zero, the rate on
overnight asset-backed commercial paper jumped from 2.4 percent on Fri-
day, September 12, to 5.7 percent on Wednesday, September 17. Firms
were reporting to the Treasury, however, that they could not obtain funds
at all. It is hard to know how to evaluate this; economists instinctively
believe that there is some interest rate at which lenders will lend, on a
highly secured basis, to blue chip industrial companies, provided the latter
are willing to pay. Other companies said they could issue commercial
paper only at very short maturities: issuance of term commercial paper
(80+ days), for example, fell from $13.7 billion on Friday, September 12,
to $2.4 billion on Friday, September 19, and over 70 percent of commer-
cial paper issued by ﬁnancial institutions was at one- to four-day maturi-
ties, compared with only about 50 percent previously. One possibility is
that there are transition costs in asset allocation decisions: once the money
market mutual funds stopped buying commercial paper, there was simply
no ready buyer to take their place—it would take time for other potential
investors to observe rising yields, evaluate particular assets, and then buy.
In the meantime, companies calling the Treasury worried about whether
they would have the liquidity to make payroll.
Meanwhile in this chaotic week, AIG failed on Tuesday, September 16,
and was kept aﬂoat by emergency lending from the Fed. Treasury staff
were sent to the New York Fed for weeks to negotiate the terms of the sup-
port package for AIG that was eventually announced on October 8.
If Monday, September 15, felt like a good day at the Treasury in that the
market was allowed to work (and it was too soon to know the full adverse
ramiﬁcations), Tuesday, September 16, when AIG was not allowed to fail,
felt much the opposite. Saving AIG was not what anyone wanted, but at
the time it seemed the only possible course of action. The belief at the
Treasury and the Fed was that bankruptcy at AIG would have far-reaching
and disruptive effects on the ﬁnancial system and on American families, as
failure of the parent ﬁrm disrupted the operating companies that provide
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assets at the time of its crisis; the ﬁrm was one of the world’s largest insur-
ance companies, the largest property and casualty insurer in the United
States, and a leading provider of insurance and annuity products and retire-
ment services. Individual 401(k) retirement plans would have been at risk,
because AIG insured the returns of large mutual funds. Nonﬁnancial busi-
nesses would also have come under pressure because AIG provided credit
guarantees to bank loans, and thus its failure would have forced banks to
raise capital. Moreover, money markets had even more exposure to AIG
than to Lehman. In sum, AIG was larger, more interconnected, and more
“consumer facing” than Lehman. There was little time to prepare for any-
thing but pumping in money—and at the time only the Fed had the ability
to do so for AIG. Eventually the AIG deal was restructured, with TARP
funds replacing Fed lending, to give AIG a more sustainable capital struc-
ture and avoid a rating downgrade that would have triggered collateral
calls. As time went on, it became clear that AIG was a black hole for tax-
payer money, and perhaps a retrospective analysis will demonstrate that
the cost-beneﬁt analysis of the action to save AIG came out on the other
side. But this was not apparent at the time.
IX. Launching the TARP
With markets in disarray, Secretary Paulson on Wednesday, September 17,
set out three principles for Treasury staff in how to deal with the crisis:
1.  Simplicity. Any policies adopted should be readily understood by
markets.
2.  Actions should be decisive and overwhelming. This was a lesson
from the experience with the GSEs, where the initial July announcement
left the situation unresolved.
3.  Actions must have the explicit endorsement of Congress. The secre-
tary made clear that a large-scale intervention would be undertaken as ﬁs-
cal policy; he would not ask or expect the Fed to take on a massive bank
rescue, and he would not look for a statutory loophole through which to
commit massive amounts of public funds (for example, by reinterpreting
the July housing bill to tap into the $300 billion that had been authorized
but not used for the Hope for Homeowners program since the program
was not yet in operation).
Treasury staff had worked late into the night on Wednesday, September
17, on a series of calls with staff from Fed headquarters and the New York
Fed, to come up with options that included ways to add liquidity to the par-
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tem broadly. That day already, the Treasury had announced the Supple-
mentary Financing Program under which the Treasury would borrow,
through special bill issues, to soak up cash on behalf of the Fed (a program
that became redundant once the Fed was given the authority to pay interest
on deposits), and the SEC had put into effect an emergency ban on short
selling of stock of ﬁnancial companies. Opinions about this latter action at
the Treasury and other government agencies differed sharply: economists
were skeptical that reducing liquidity in markets would be helpful, whereas
those with market backgrounds thought it was important to short-circuit
“predatory” behavior in the markets.
Liquidity options focused on money market mutual funds and the com-
mercial paper market. After rapid consultations with industry participants,
the Treasury announced on Friday morning, September 19, in a pre-market
conference call, a temporary guarantee program for money market mutual
funds to directly stem the panicked withdrawals. At the same time the Fed
announced its Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual
Fund Liquidity Facility, to provide money market funds with liquidity so
that they could avoid ﬁre sales of their assets in the face of redemption pres-
sures. Fund managers were quite positive about the Treasury guarantee
until they realized they would have to pay for it; most funds eventually
participated, but not happily (and with no subsequent failures, the guaran-
tee will be a moneymaker for taxpayers). There was incoming ﬁre at the
same time from banks, who (reasonably) complained that the guarantee put
them at a competitive disadvantage against the money market funds. This
became a familiar story: nearly every Treasury action had some side effect
or consequence that we had not expected or had foreseen only imperfectly.
Other options included action by the SEC to reinstate the so-called
uptick rule, which prohibits short selling of a stock when the price has just
declined from one trade to the next, or to require disclosure on short posi-
tions, having the Fed allow investment banks to convert rapidly into bank
holding companies (which Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley did the
next weekend), or changes in accounting or tax rules to foster bank con-
solidation. Guidance on a related tax issue—the so-called section 382 rule
on the use of tax credits from net operating losses of acquisitions—was
released by the Treasury to some controversy later in September. The con-
troversy arose because of reports that this action played a role in the acqui-
sition of Wachovia by Wells Fargo; the guidance was repealed in the
February 2009 stimulus bill. Everyone was aware that this was not the time
to propose fundamental changes in the regulatory structure of the ﬁnancial
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directly with long-term goals such as had been set out in the Blueprint.
The actions taken with respect to money market mutual funds and com-
mercial paper seemed useful but incremental—it was a sign of the times
that so drastic a step as using the Treasury’s main source of emergency
funding to put a blanket guarantee on heretofore-unguaranteed assets
seemed incremental. What was still needed was action to get ahead of the
downward market dynamic and broadly stabilize the ﬁnancial system. The
options were familiar from the “break the glass” work back in March and
April: buy stakes in banks directly, buy the toxic assets, or dramatically
expand the FHA and Hope for Homeowners programs to reﬁnance loans
and improve asset performance from the bottom up. Buying stakes in
banks would constitute a “high powered” capital injection, whereas buying
assets would add liquidity but also inject a wedge of capital to the extent
that the price paid after the announcement of the program was higher than
the price ex ante (because simply announcing an asset purchase program
would boost asset prices).
Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke went to Capitol Hill Thurs-
day night, September 18, to tell congressional leaders that the problems in
ﬁnancial markets posed a severe threat to the economy, and that they
wanted authority to buy the illiquid assets that were creating uncertainty
about the viability of firms at the core of the financial system. Equity
markets had rallied strongly that day even before the meeting, evidently
sparked by afternoon comments from Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY)
that the Treasury and the Fed were working on a “comprehensive solution”
to the ﬁnancial market difﬁculties. Senator Schumer had it exactly right—
but no one at the Treasury could ﬁgure out what he actually knew when he
spoke.
On Saturday, September 20, the Treasury sent Congress a “Legislative
Proposal for Treasury Authority to Purchase Mortgage-Related Assets”—
a three-page request for a $700 billion fund to be used over the following
two years. The proposal sought maximum ﬂexibility, allowing the secre-
tary to determine the terms and conditions for purchases of “mortgage-
related assets from any ﬁnancial institution having its headquarters in the
United States.” In doing so, section 3 of the proposal instructed the sec-
retary to “take into consideration means for (1) providing stability or
preventing disruption to the financial markets or banking system; and
(2) protecting the taxpayer,” while section 4 required reports to Congress.
Section 8 was to raise immense controversy, with its assertion that “Deci-
sions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are nonreview-
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court of law or any administrative agency.” The legislation eventually
enacted—the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008—showed if
anything that there had been a counterreaction, as it provided abundant
layers of oversight, including by the Government Accountability Ofﬁce, a
new inspector general specially for the TARP, and a congressional over-
sight panel. Treasury staff were soon to venture that there would be more
people working on TARP oversight than on the TARP itself. The initial
proposal was meant purely as a starting point, not as a demand. In retro-
spect, however, the sparseness of those three pages was a communications
mistake that foreshadowed later recriminations.
Eventually the lengthier EESA was negotiated with Congress, but the
core was the same: the Treasury would have broad authority to purchase
$700 billion of assets through the TARP, with the money split into two
equal tranches (technically the Treasury had access to only an initial $250
billion, but an additional $100 billion could be obtained without a further
role for Congress). Most of the negotiation was over issues relating to
executive compensation and warrants. Members of Congress eventually
settled for fairly modest restrictions on compensation (their main focus),
but congressional staff insisted that the government should receive warrants
in the ﬁrm selling assets to the government rather than warrants relating to
the future performance of the speciﬁc assets purchased. Congressional
staff also insisted on a provision to guard against “unjust enrichment,”
which was deﬁned as the Treasury buying an MBS for more than the seller
had paid for it. This effectively made it impossible for, say, a hedge fund to
buy assets from a bank before the TARP got up and running and later sell
those assets to the Treasury. This was counterproductive; it ran precisely
counter to the goal of using the TARP to get illiquid MBSs off bank bal-
ance sheets. But this obvious point fell on deaf ears on the Hill.
The TARP proposal was voted down in the House of Representatives
on September 29, and an amended bill was then enacted on October 3.
President Bush signed the bill on arrival and then came over to the Trea-
sury to give a pep talk to staff assembled in the department’s Diplomatic
Reception Room. Always gracious, the president had warm words for the
Treasury team, including recognition of the Treasury dining room staff,
who had become part of the weekend efforts.
While Congress debated the legislation, markets got worse—the S&P
500 index fell almost 9 percent the day the House rejected the bill—and
conditions continued to deteriorate after EESA was enacted. One-month
and three-month LIBOR rates rose another 100 basis points after EESA was
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about 30 percent on September 19 to 45 percent on October 3 and 70 per-
cent on October 10. After EESA was approved, the amount of outstand-
ing commercial paper fell by another $160 billion, or nearly 10 percent,
and financial institutions were issuing nearly 90 percent of their com-
mercial paper on a one- to four-day basis. The Dow Jones Industrial
Average fell 18 percent, or almost 1,900 points, the week after EESA was
approved.
It is hard to remember from the vantage point of mid-2009, when the
United States and other nations are in the midst of a severe economic
downturn, but in late September and early October of 2008 it was a chal-
lenge to explain to people that what was happening in credit markets mat-
tered for the broad economy—that it would affect the proverbial Main
Street, not just lower Manhattan. By mid-October, however, everyone
understood that the crisis was real. Families stopped spending, while ﬁrms
stopped hiring and put investment projects on hold. The economy had been
deteriorating since July after having been in a sideways grind for the ﬁrst
half of 2008. Activity pitched slightly downward by some economic mea-
sures, but GDP growth remained positive in the ﬁrst and second quarters,
even though growth was not strong enough to maintain positive job growth
or prevent rising unemployment.
In October and beyond, everyone got the message to pull back on
spending all at once—and the economy plunged. For some time within the
Treasury, we had been analyzing statistical relationships between ﬁnancial
markets and the real economy. Back in February we had predicted in inter-
nal analysis that the unemployment rate, which had been only 4.9 percent
in January, would reach 5.5 to 6 percent by year’s end as the economy
slowed, but would hit 6.5 percent or more if the problems in ﬁnancial
markets became worse than expected. That was the limit of the ability of
our (linear) models to predict the worst, although we acknowledged and
explained this limitation in the prose of the accompanying memos. In fact,
the unemployment rate reached 7.2 percent in December 2008, en route to
8.1 percent by February 2009, with yet-higher rates to come.
Many factors were at work to dampen consumer and business spending,
including the weak and deteriorating job market and huge wealth losses in
both housing and equity markets. Yet the way in which the TARP was
proposed and eventually enacted must have contributed to the lockup in
spending. Having long known that the Treasury could not obtain the
authorities to act until both Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke
could honestly state that the economic and ﬁnancial world seemed to be
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gressional leaders and then several days later in testimony to Congress on
September 23 and 24. Americans might not have understood the precise
channels by which credit markets would affect the real economy, but they
ﬁnally realized that it was happening. And whether or not they agreed with
the proposed response of buying assets with the TARP, they could plainly
see that the U.S. political system appeared insufﬁcient to the task of a con-
sidered response to the crisis. Surely these circumstances contributed to
the economic downturn, although the extent to which they did remains for
future study. A counterfactual to consider is that the Treasury and the Fed
could have acted incrementally, with backstops and a ﬂood of liquidity
focused on money markets and commercial paper, but without the TARP.
With ﬁnancial institutions beyond Lehman weakening as asset perfor-
mance deteriorated, it seems likely that the lockup would have taken place
anyway, and perhaps sooner than it did.
The proposal to buy assets was met with substantial criticism from aca-
demic economists, with a leading source of skepticism being faculty at the
University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business (where, ironically, I
taught a course on money and banking to MBA candidates in the spring of
2009 after leaving the Treasury). There was little public defense of the
proposal—instead, the Treasury’s efforts were aimed mainly at the 535
members of Congress whose votes were needed. These were difﬁcult
issues to explain to the vast majority of Americans who had not yet felt the
direct impact of the credit market disruption in their daily lives, yet it
strikes me as a fair criticism that the Treasury did not try hard enough.
So far as I know, I provided the only detailed public defense of the Paul-
son plan at the time that addressed criticisms from both academic econo-
mists and market participants. In a September 25, 2008, posting on Harvard
economics professor Gregory Mankiw’s blog, I addressed three common
concerns about the Treasury’s proposal to buy assets.
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The ﬁrst criticism was that the only way the Treasury plan could work
was if the Treasury intentionally overpaid for assets. Implicit in this criti-
cism was either that the Treasury would not overpay, and thus the plan
would not work, or that the Treasury intended to bail out ﬁnancial institu-
tions (starting, the cynics inevitably said, with the secretary’s former ﬁrm,
Goldman Sachs). This is simply wrong in both directions. At the Treasury,
we were already working hard to set up reverse auctions with which to buy
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elicit market prices. On this we received a huge amount of help from auc-
tion experts in academia—an outpouring of support that to us represented
the economics profession at its ﬁnest. There was no plan to overpay. The
announcement of the proposal (or rather, Senator Schumer’s announce-
ment) had lifted asset prices by itself. If the Treasury got the asset prices
exactly right in the reverse auctions, those prices would be higher than the
prices that would have obtained before the program was announced. That
difference means that by paying the correct price, Treasury would be inject-
ing capital relative to the situation ex ante. And the taxpayer could still see
gains—say, if the announcement and enactment of the TARP removed
some uncertainty about the economy and asset performance, but not all.
Then prices could rise further over time. But the main point is that it is not
necessary to overpay to add capital.
The second criticism of the plan to buy assets was that in order to safe-
guard the taxpayer’s interests, the warrants in the plan needed to give the
government additional protection (that is, it should pay a lower price ex
post) if the assets being purchased turned out to perform markedly worse
than was contemplated at the time of the transaction. This would have been
a valid point had the warrants in question been speciﬁc to the assets being
purchased. But this was not the case—as already noted, congressional staff
had insisted instead that the warrants be on the ﬁrms selling the assets, not
on the assets themselves. Thus, the point being made by academic and
other critics was a non sequitur. Instead, warrants proved to be a huge
hassle for the auctions in that they diluted the price signal and thereby
confused the bidding.
This was a straightforward application of the Modigliani-Miller theo-
rem. Rather than bid to sell assets such as MBSs at a particular price to the
Treasury, ﬁrms would have to bid to jointly sell both MBSs and stakes in
the selling ﬁrm. If the warrants and assets were identical across sellers, the
price of the assets would simply adjust to net out the value of the warrants.
Modigliani-Miller implies that the price of the asset (assuming the auction
gets it right) will adjust to offset the value of any warrants the Treasury
receives. In this case of a reverse auction, imagine that the price of an asset
is set at $10. If the Treasury instead demands warrants for future gains of
some sort, then the price will rise by the expected value of the warrants. If
that value is, say, $2, the Treasury will pay $12 total for the asset and the
warrants.
Working with academic experts, we came up with a reverse auction
mechanism that would go a long way to make for apples-to-apples com-
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knew that it was possible only to minimize adverse selection, not to elimi-
nate it. Firm-speciﬁc warrants confounded this, since even if the MBSs
being offered by seller A were identical to those offered by seller B, the
warrants on ﬁrms A and B would not be identical. (We considered using
penny warrants—essentially common stock—to get around the problem
but concluded that this was contrary to congressional intent.) All of this
resulted from the insistence in Congress on this type of warrant. Ironically,
critics of the September blog posting asserted that the Treasury did not
understand the Modigliani-Miller theorem, when in fact it was the critics
who did not understand the nature of the warrants speciﬁed by Congress.
The third criticism of the original plan to purchase assets was that it
would be better to inject capital into banks—to buy parts of institutions
instead of the assets they held. Capital injections were allowed even in
the initial three-page proposal, under which Treasury could purchase any
mortgage-related assets, including shares of companies that originate mort-
gages. The problem with this criticism is that Secretary Paulson never
would have gotten legislative authority if he had proposed from the start to
inject capital into banks. The secretary truly intended to buy assets—this
was absolutely the plan; the TARP focused on asset purchases and was not
a bait-and-switch maneuver to inject capital. But Secretary Paulson would
have gotten zero votes from Republican members of the House of Repre-
sentatives for a proposal that would have been portrayed as nationalizing
the banking system. And Democratic House members would not have
voted for the proposal without the bipartisan cover of votes from Republi-
cans. This was simply a political reality—and a binding constraint on the
Treasury. The calls from academics to inject capital were helpful, how-
ever, in lending support for the eventual switch to capital injections (even
though at times the vitriolic criticism was frustrating in that it was so polit-
ically oblivious).
A similar calculus applies to suggestions that holders of bank debt
should have been compelled to accept a debt-for-equity swap. As Luigi
Zingales (2008, p. 4) notes, debt-for-equity swaps could “immediately
make banks solid, by providing a large equity buffer.” All that would be
required, according to Zingales, was a change in the bankruptcy code. A
major change to the bankruptcy law had previously been enacted (for bet-
ter or for worse, depending on one’s point of view) with the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, but this was the
culmination of years of legislative debate. Thus, the idea of a further instan-
taneous change in the bankruptcy code was unrealistic. Indeed, efforts to
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debate over the 2005 act, along with controversial provisions such as the
mortgage cramdown. The simple truth is that it was not feasible to force a
debt-for-equity swap or to rapidly enact the laws necessary to make this
feasible. To academics who made this suggestion to me directly, my
response was to gently suggest that they spend more time in Washington.
X. From Asset Purchases to Capital Injections
Secretary Paulson’s intent to use the TARP to purchase assets reﬂected a
philosophical concern with having the government buy equity stakes in
banks: he saw it as fundamentally a bad idea to have the government
involved in bank ownership. From the vantage point of early September, it
still looked like buying $700 billion of assets would be enough to settle the
markets: there were about $1 trillion each of whole loans and structured
products such as MBSs and CDOs on U.S. ﬁrms’ balance sheets, so that
$700 billion would have been sufﬁcient to add liquidity, improve price dis-
covery by closing bid-ask spreads, and inject some measure of capital
relative to the situation ex ante.
As markets continued to deteriorate after the enactment of EESA, how-
ever, Secretary Paulson switched gears and came to favor injecting capital,
since he well understood that directly adding capital to the banking system
provided greater leverage in terms of providing a buffer to ensure the via-
bility of banks against further losses from their rapidly souring assets. Con-
ﬁdence in the banking system continued to deteriorate, with the one-month
LIBOR-OIS spread (the difference between LIBOR and the overnight
index swap rate), for example, rising from around 250 basis points when
EESA was enacted to nearly 350 basis points in the first full week of
October, just before the three-day Columbus Day weekend (figure 2).
With conﬁdence rapidly ebbing in the banking system, the secretary, in
consultation with the Fed chairman and New York Fed President Timothy
Geithner, instructed the “deal team” at the Treasury to prepare term sheets
that spelled out the ﬁnancial arrangements under which capital would be
injected into banks.
Discussions began as well with the FDIC around the middle of the week
of October 5 about guarantees on bank debt—an idea that we were hearing
about from Wall Street economists and which had some support at both the
Treasury and the Fed. As Pietro Veronesi and Zingales (2009) have shown,
these guarantees involved a huge beneﬁt for market participants—most of
the “gift” calculated by Veronesi and Zingales arises from the guarantees.
50 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009
11641-01a_Swagel_rev.qxd:11641-01a_Swagel.qxd  8/19/09  3:01 PM  Page 50No one at the Treasury or the Fed was happy about the prospect of giving
blanket guarantees, but in the midst of what appeared to be a renewed run
on the banking system, this blunt instrument was seen as essential to stop-
ping the run. This highlights the constraint that the policymaking process
must be done in real time even while the rush of events continues.
Treasury staff had been working on plans for capital injections for some
time, focusing on matching programs under which the Treasury would
invest on terms similar to what private investors received in exchange for
equal investments in banks. In early October, however, banks were neither
able nor willing to raise private capital on the terms available from private
investors—if any were to be found. Warren Buffett had extracted a pre-
mium for investing in Goldman Sachs, but other ﬁrms did not have even
that possibility available to them. In the face of these circumstances, the
Treasury instead worked with bank regulators and outside counsel to
develop term sheets for a stand-alone investment by the Treasury; this
work went from not far past the starting line to completion in just four
days, from Thursday, October 9, to Monday, October 13. It was on that
Monday that the CEOs of the nine largest American banks came to the
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Figure 2. One-Month LIBOR-OIS Spread, April 2007–March 2009
Source: Kashkari (2009).
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Chairman Christopher Cox, and others to be told about and ultimately
accept capital injections from the TARP in the form of preferred stock pur-
chases. This was called the Capital Purchase Program, or CPP.
An important consideration with regard to the terms of the capital injec-
tions was that the U.S. executive branch has no authority to force a private
institution to accept government capital. This is a hard legal constraint.
The government can take over a failing institution, but this is done on a
one-by-one basis, not en masse, and is not the same as injecting capital into
an institution that is healthy in order to guard against future asset prob-
lems. Therefore, to ensure that the capital injection was widely and rapidly
accepted, the terms had to be attractive, not punitive. In a sense, this had to
be the opposite of the “Sopranos” or the “Godfather”—not an attempt to
intimidate banks, but instead a deal so attractive that banks would be
unwise to refuse it. The terms of the capital injections were later to lead to
reports that the Treasury had “overpaid” for its stakes in banks, which is
true relative to the terms received by Warren Buffett. But this was for a
policy purpose: to ensure broad and rapid take-up.
The terms of the CPP—the TARP’s program to put capital into “good
banks”—allowed banks to sell preferred stock to the Treasury in an
amount equal to up to 3 percent of their risk-weighted assets. The annual
interest rate on the preferred shares was 5 percent for ﬁve years and then
increased to 9 percent, meaning that banks would have a substantial incen-
tive to pay back the money at that point. This made the funds more of a
ﬁve-year bridge loan than high-quality capital. EESA was about distressed
assets, which might have seemed at odds with the notion of the CPP as a
“good bank” program, but the idea was that the low level of conﬁdence
among banks, as indicated by the soaring LIBOR-OIS spread, meant that
the whole ﬁnancial system was under stress. Capital injections would fos-
ter stability in banks in particular, and thus in the ﬁnancial system as a
whole, initially by ensuring that banks had the capacity to lend against a
sufﬁcient capital buffer and would not have to hunker down and hoard cap-
ital. The ultimate goal was to improve conﬁdence in the system so that
over time private capital would again invest in the banking system.
Other terms were similarly aimed at ensuring broad uptake: the Treasury
wanted no part of running banks, so the preferred shares would be non-
voting except when an issue affected an entire class of investors in a way
that would adversely affect the taxpayer’s interest. The Treasury received
warrants with a 10-year maturity that could be exercised at any time, with
an aggregate market value equal to 15 percent of the amount of the pre-
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average stock price for each institution on the day of preliminary approval
of the investment. Warrants in this context made sense in that they allowed
the taxpayer to participate in any upside from increased stability in the
ﬁnancial system. Banks were allowed to continue to pay dividends (but not
to increase them); this provision in particular drew criticism, but it, too,
was aimed at ensuring broad take-up of the capital.
The capital injections included rules meant to address not just the letter
but also the spirit of EESA, which required participating ﬁnancial institu-
tions to meet “appropriate standards for executive compensation and cor-
porate governance,” while avoiding such burdensome restrictions that
banks would not participate or would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to attract and retain
key personnel. It is worth spelling out these restrictions in some detail to
make clear that the TARP from the start had reasonable provisions in place
to protect taxpayers—this might not have seemed the case to someone
landing in Washington in March 2009 and observing the president of the
United States competing with members of Congress over who could most
angrily denounce the compensation agreements at AIG (which, it should
be noted, were outside the CPP).
Each bank’s compensation committee would be required to review
incentive compensation features each year with the CEO, the CFO, and
the three highest-paid executives to ensure that contracts did not encour-
age unnecessary and excessive risk, and to certify annually that this had
been done. Incentive payments for senior executives could be taken
back after the fact if it was found that they had been made on the basis
of materially inaccurate statements of earnings or gains or performance
criteria. These rules applied to more executives than section 304 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the provision that required executives to return
bonuses in the event of an accounting error) and would not be limited to
financial restatements. Banks could not provide senior executive offi-
cers with golden parachute payments; severance payments were capped
at three times base salary, calculated as a moving average of each offi-
cer’s taxable compensation over the previous five years. And recipients
of TARP capital would have to agree to limit the income tax deduction
of compensation paid to each senior executive to $500,000 instead of 
$1 million for as long as the Treasury held a capital stake in the bank.
This was not a tax rule but instead a bilateral contract between the Trea-
sury and the firm. In sum, the TARP did not involve the Treasury in 
the details of setting pay, nor did it outright ban bonuses or severance
pay, but it did include a number of provisions aimed at ensuring that
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compensation.
As has been widely reported, most (but not all) of the nine CEOs needed
little persuasion to accept the capital investments on Monday, October 13.
Nearly 8,500 banks were eligible to receive TARP funds through the CPP,
but these nine alone accounted for close to half of both the more than $8
trillion of deposits and the more than $13 trillion of assets in the U.S. bank-
ing system. In contrast, the bottom 70 percent of banks all together
accounted for only about 5 percent of both total assets and total deposits. It
would take time for the Treasury to inject capital into these thousands of
banks. The combined actions of that Monday—the FDIC guarantee and
the injections into the top nine banks—stabilized the ﬁnancial sector, as
demonstrated by the LIBOR-OIS spread falling back to 100 basis points
(ﬁgure 2). Although this seemed like progress, it was still twice the spread
that had prevailed before Lehman’s failure, suggesting that market partici-
pants were still not reassured about the soundness of ﬁnancial institutions.
Subsequent events were to prove their doubts correct.
EESA had created a new Ofﬁce of Financial Stability within the Trea-
sury, which Neel Kashkari was appointed to head as interim assistant sec-
retary (he had been conﬁrmed by the Senate earlier in 2008 to be an
assistant secretary for international affairs). The ofﬁce borrowed personnel
from across the government and brought in experts from the private sector
to help get the CPP up and running. The details of the process are beyond
the scope of this paper, but sufﬁce it to say that TARP staff, working in
concert with the federal bank regulators, worked diligently and effec-
tively: a January 27 press release from the Treasury noted that the CPP
team had made capital injections of $194.2 billion in 317 institutions in
43 states and Puerto Rico since Columbus Day. President Obama was to
tell Congress on February 24, 2009, that he was “infuriated by the mis-
management and the results” of the assistance for struggling banks. His
actions, however, belied the words on the teleprompter—the Ofﬁce of
Financial Stability was kept essentially whole through the presidential
transition and beyond.
XI. The Decision to Call Off Asset Purchases
Of the ﬁrst $350 billion of the TARP, $250 billion was allocated to the CPP,
which was enough for all banks that might potentially apply to get capital
equal to up to 3 percent of their risk-weighted assets. It was already clear
that part of the TARP would be needed to restructure the federal rescue of
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implied that with the TARP now available, the Treasury should take this
operation over from the Fed (which was done on November 10, 2008).
Financial market conditions had improved since the launch of the CPP
and the announcement of other actions including additional Fed facilities
aimed at money markets and commercial paper issuance. But credit mar-
kets were still disrupted—and the implosion of business and household
demand as output fell and the labor market sagged would make things
worse.
Treasury staff turned to the task of ﬁguring out how to allocate the re-
mainder of the TARP, a process that ultimately led Secretary Paulson to
announce, on November 12, 2008, that he would not use the TARP for its
original purpose of purchasing assets. This decision ultimately came down
to the fact that the TARP’s $700 billion looked insufﬁcient to buy assets on
a scale large enough to make a difference while at the same time holding in
reserve enough resources for additional capital programs that might be
needed. What we did not fully see in late October and early November
was that the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet could be used to extend the
TARP. This was done in late 2008 and early 2009, with ring fence insur-
ance applied to assets held by Citigroup and Bank of America, and then
on a larger scale with the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF) announced in late 2008 and the Public-Private Investment Funds
announced in 2009.
We had reverse auctions to buy MBSs essentially ready to go by late
October 2008—including a pricing mechanism—but faced a decision as to
whether we had the resources left in the TARP to implement them. We ﬁg-
ured that at least $200 billion was needed for the program to make a differ-
ence. With credit markets still in worse shape than before the TARP had
been proposed, it seemed more important to reserve TARP resources for
future capital injections, including the wherewithal to act in the face of fur-
ther AIG-like situations. Secretary Paulson therefore decided to cancel the
auctions. Another factor in this decision was simply time: the ﬁrst reverse
auction to buy MBSs might have taken place in early December but
would have been small—perhaps a few hundred million dollars—while
we became comfortable with the systems. The auctions would have ramped
up in size but still would likely have remained at $5 billion or $10 billion a
month, meaning that it could have taken two or more years to deploy the
TARP resources in this way.
A concern of many at the Treasury was that the reverse auctions would
indicate prices for MBSs so low as to make other companies appear to be
PHILLIP SWAGEL 55
11641-01a_Swagel_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:45 PM  Page 55insolvent if their balance sheets were revalued to the auction results.9 This
could easily be handled within the reverse auction framework, however:
many of the individual securities are owned by only a small number of
entities, so Treasury would not have purchased all of the outstanding
issues of any security such as an MBS. The fraction to be purchased thus
represented a demand shift—we could experiment with the share of each
security to bid on; the more we purchased, the higher, presumably, would
be the price that resulted. But this was yet another reason why the auctions
would take time—and why to some at the Treasury the whole auction
setup looked like a big science project. Further delaying the auctions was a
procurement process that left us with an outside vendor that was supposed
to run the auctions but whose staff did not seem to understand that the form
of the auction mattered crucially, given the complexity of the MBSs and
the ultimate goal of protecting the taxpayer (although, to be fair, the ven-
dor was receiving mixed signals from within the Treasury as well). War-
rants and executive compensation restrictions played havoc with setting up
the auctions. For executive compensation, the administrative systems had
to be able to detect, for each of the many ﬁrms (which often had many sub-
sidiaries), when the total securities purchased crossed the congressionally
determined dollar amounts at which the restrictions kicked in. And ﬁnally,
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc warrants complicated the auctions, since as noted above,
they confounded the effort made in the reverse auctions to ensure a level
playing ﬁeld across assets being offered for sale by different ﬁrms.
Despite all this, by the last weekend of October, the auction team
returned from a day of meetings in New York on Sunday, October 26, feel-
ing that the asset purchases could be done, ﬁrst for MBSs and then later for
whole loans (for which the idea was to create “artificial MBSs” out of a
random selection of the whole loans offered by banks). We would have
tried two auction approaches, one static and one dynamic—the latter
approach is discussed by Lawrence Ausubel and Peter Cramton (2008),
who were among the academic experts providing enormous help to the
Treasury in developing the reverse auctions.
Meeting at the Treasury on Sunday evening, October 26, Treasury senior
staff and the secretary focused on the key question of whether to proceed
with asset purchases or instead to put that work on hold and focus on addi-
tional programs to inject capital and on the nascent securitization project
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which eventually turned into the TALF). At another meeting the following
Sunday, November 2, senior staff and the secretary went through the
options about the uses of the remaining money in the ﬁrst part of the TARP
and the $350 billion in the second tranche.
By the time of this second meeting, the economy had deteriorated and
the tide of public opinion had begun to turn against the TARP, so much so
that there were real doubts as to whether Congress would release the second
stage of TARP funds. We knew that to have a chance, there had to be a
well-developed set of programs to account for the money. The Treasury had
to be able to explain what it was doing and how the programs ﬁt together—
never our strength. There could not be another instance of asking for money
to do one thing and then using it for another as had happened with the ﬁrst
part of the TARP.
The objectives that the TARP needed to accomplish were, in broad
strokes, to continue to stabilize the ﬁnancial system and avoid systemic
meltdown; to improve credit markets and facilitate stronger demand by
consumers and businesses; to protect taxpayers; and to help homeowners.
To meet these objectives, there were several possible uses of TARP funds
in late October and early November:
—More capital for banks and nonbanks, including one-time situations
such as systemically signiﬁcant failing institutions and nonfailing ﬁnancial
ﬁrms other than banks. With regard to nonbanks, proposals were on the
table to inject capital into the broader ﬁnancial sector, including life insur-
ers, municipal bond insurers, and private mortgage insurers. Resources
for further capital would also constitute “dry powder” in case of unfore-
seen situations.
—Asset purchases to buy illiquid MBSs and whole loans.
—Foreclosure prevention or forward-looking actions to lower mortgage
rates and thereby boost housing demand. This category included ideas
such as directly funding the GSEs to buy down interest rates for homebuy-
ers, something that the Fed eventually put into effect with its purchases of
GSE debt and MBSs.
—Direct assistance to unplug securitization channels, which had been
locked up since August 2007 but had previously provided ﬁnancing for
auto loans, credit cards, student loans, commercial real estate, and jumbo
mortgages. This nascent “securitization project” eventually grew into the
TALF—a centerpiece of the programs in effect in 2009.
The TARP was looking undersized against these competing alterna-
tives, particularly as the slowing economy began to have a noticeable
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New York Fed of bank losses and capital raised suggested that banks
faced a capital hole above and beyond the initial $250 billion CPP of
perhaps as much as $100 billion in the case of a moderate recession and
perhaps another $250 billion or more in a severe recession. These would
be in addition to hundreds of billions of dollars in losses among U.S.
nonbank financial firms such as hedge funds and insurance companies.
The decision to cancel the asset purchases was made on October 26
with this in mind. Instead, the focus was to be on developing the securiti-
zation project and a second capital program with a private match. There
were some continued discussions of possible whole loan purchase pro-
grams. At even a modest scale, this activity would have allowed the secre-
tary to say that he was fulﬁlling his initial promise to buy toxic assets—the
bad mortgages—directly and then to address foreclosures by modifying
the loans. Again, however, the decision was made that it was more impor-
tant to husband the resources.
With the work on asset purchases set aside, Treasury staff worked
intensely during the week between October 26 and November 2 to flesh
out proposals for the remaining uses of the TARP: more capital, assis-
tance for securitization, and foreclosure prevention. To unlock the sec-
ond $350 billion of the TARP, we realized that $50 billion of it would
have to be used for a foreclosure prevention effort. Helping homeowners
had been part of the TARP’s original mandate. Section 109(a) of EESA
specified that:
To the extent that the Secretary acquires mortgages, mortgage backed
securities, and other assets secured by residential real estate . . . the Secre-
tary shall implement a plan that seeks to maximize assistance for home-
owners and use the authority of the Secretary to encourage the servicers of
the underlying mortgages, considering net present value to the taxpayer, to
take advantage of the HOPE for Homeowners Program under section 257
of the National Housing Act or other available programs to minimize
foreclosures. In addition, the Secretary may use loan guarantees and
credit enhancements to facilitate loan modifications to prevent avoidable
foreclosures.
This language made sense in the context of buying whole loans and MBSs:
the Treasury could modify the whole loans it purchased or encourage ser-
vicers to modify loans for mortgages in securitizations where the Treasury
owned a large share of the MBS structure. But the EESA language never
contemplated direct spending to subsidize modiﬁcations such as were occur-
ring under the FDIC insurance loss-sharing proposal and the interest rate
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troubled assets. Implementing a foreclosure avoidance plan under the law
would require the Treasury to intentionally purchase a loss-making asset,
where the loss was then structured, using ﬁnancial engineering, to turn into
the subsidies to the parties for taking the desired actions to avoid fore-
closure (as either insurance payouts or interest rate subsidies). This was
hugely ironic, since at the same time that the Treasury was being pushed to
use TARP resources for foreclosure avoidance, we were being criticized
for having overpaid for the preferred shares in banks.
From the secretary’s point of view, it was essential to husband the
TARP resources to use to shore up the ﬁnancial sector. By this time he was
less adamant against crossing the line and using public money for fore-
closure avoidance, but he did not want it to be done with TARP money. As
discussed previously, however, Congress did not appear eager to record a
vote that transparently spent money on foreclosure avoidance: members
wanted the outcome but not any potential blame for a bailout of “irrespon-
sible” homeowners (a reasonable concern in light of the political backlash
that ensued when the Obama administration announced that it would
implement the interest rate subsidy proposal).
By early November it was becoming increasingly clear that what we
were saving the “dry powder” for would include addressing the crisis at the
automobile companies. A group of Treasury staff had worked with the
Commerce Department on auto industry issues from Columbus Day on.
Indeed, I went over to the Commerce Department building that Monday
with a group from Treasury to meet with General Motors management.
Walking out the south side of the Treasury building around noon, we
strode past the television cameras that had assembled to get shots of the
nine bank CEOs, whose pending arrival at Treasury had by then become
known to the press.
At a November 12 speech to the assembled press, Secretary Paulson
formally announced that he would not be using the TARP to buy assets.
The secretary fully understood that canceling the auctions would make it
seem as if he was switching course yet again—ﬁrst in changing from asset
purchases to capital injections, and then in canceling the asset purchases
altogether. He was willing to take the criticism, however, as he viewed it
as essential to keep the resources available for more capital injections. The
problem was that the capital program that was slated to form the core of
the second wave of TARP programs was never developed. Instead, events
again overtook the Treasury as problems at Citigroup and the U.S. auto
companies demanded attention.
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Two weeks later, on November 23, 2008, the Treasury, the Fed, and the
FDIC jointly announced that Citigroup was being given another $20 bil-
lion of TARP capital (on less generous terms than the CPP but not as oner-
ous as those faced by AIG before the TARP was available), and that the
three federal agencies would provide guarantees against losses on a $306
billion pool of Citi assets. The Treasury put up a modest amount of TARP
money as a second loss position, the FDIC took the next set of losses, and
the Fed then took the rest of the downside. This position of the Treasury
reﬂected the language of section 102 of EESA, which counted each dollar
of gross assets insured by the TARP as a dollar against the $700 billion
allotment. This meant that it was most efﬁcient from a TARP perspective
for the Treasury to take an early loss position and provide coverage of a
narrow band in the asset structure with a high probability of loss. The Fed
could then use its balance sheet to take on the rest of the risk.
The crucial new development in this use of TARP resources was the use
of the Fed’s balance sheet to effectively extend the TARP beyond $700
billion; the Fed decided that having the Treasury ahead of it in a sufﬁcient
loss position provided the credit enhancement for it to take further down-
side risk. As had been the case with the Bear Stearns transaction, it took
some time for the arrangement to be understood in Washington. The trans-
action, it turned out, did not appear to stabilize Citigroup. This could have
reﬂected a number of reasons, including that the pool of covered assets
was still modest compared with a balance sheet of nearly $2 trillion, that
the Treasury did not provide details of the assets within the ring fence, and
perhaps that many market participants saw the ﬁrm as deeply insolvent.
A key insight, however, is that underpricing insurance coverage is eco-
nomically similar to overpaying for assets—but turns out to be far less
transparent. This insight underpins both the TALF and the bank rescue
programs announced by the Obama administration in March 2009. The
federal government is effectively providing potential buyers of assets in
either program with a two-part subsidy of both low-cost ﬁnancing and
low-cost insurance. This federal contribution then helps to close the bid-
ask spread and restore functioning in illiquid markets.
From the perspective of the Treasury in November 2008, the second
Citi transaction meant that we had fallen behind the market and were back
into reactive mode. Moreover, the downside insurance appeared to give
rise to moral hazard, as Citi announced its support for the mortgage cram-
down proposal. Many within the Treasury viewed this as an artifact of the
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ﬁnancing behind the ring fence insurance—Citi could make this politically
popular offer because taxpayers ultimately were on the hook for the losses.
A feeling of resignation likewise marked the work by Treasury staff on a
similar ring fence insurance scheme and additional TARP capital promised
to Bank of America late in 2008. Treasury staff nonetheless worked
intensely until the transaction was formalized on January 16, 2009, the last
business day of the Bush administration.
In contrast, the use of the TARP to support the auto companies was
straightforwardly political: Congress did not appear to want to take on
the burden of writing these checks, and President Bush did not want his
administration to end with the firms’ bankruptcies. A concern in the
administration was that the rapid collapse of the automakers would have
severe adverse consequences for an economy that was already stagger-
ing. With the incoming administration refusing to coordinate policy
with regard to automakers, TARP funds were used to provide the firms
with enough breathing space to give the next team a chance to address
the situation.
Using TARP to support unsustainable ﬁrms is akin to burning pub-
lic money while industry stakeholders arrive at a sustainable long-term
arrangement. This appears to be the American approach to systemically
signiﬁcant “zombie” ﬁrms—to use public resources to cushion their dis-
solution and restructuring.
XIII. Evaluation and Conclusion
There is something of a playbook (to again use a football metaphor) for
dealing with a banking crisis. The steps are familiar from previous crises,
such as the Swedish bank crisis in the early 1990s:
—Winnow the banking system by putting insolvent institutions out of
business (including through nationalization where a buyer is not at hand).
The key is to avoid supporting zombie ﬁrms that squander resources and
clog credit channels. This was done to a modest degree with the decisions
made by the federal bank regulators and the Treasury regarding which
institutions would receive money from the TARP under the CPP. The
denial of funds to National City Bank and its acquisition by PNC Bank,
however, set off a ﬁrestorm of criticism that banks were using their TARP
funds for mergers rather than to support lending. This criticism is mis-
guided; it is fundamentally good for everyone when a strong bank that is
in a position to boost lending and serve its community takes over a weak
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onward. In any case, the furor revealed that there was no prospect of
putting out of business a large number of banks.
—Recapitalize the surviving banks to ensure that they have a buffer
against further losses. The TARP was able to do this in a broad and rapid
way. Notwithstanding President Obama’s assertion to the contrary, the
CPP appears as of this writing to be a salient success of the TARP.
—Resolve uncertainty about the viability of surviving banks by either
taking away or “disinfecting” their toxic assets, for example through ring
fence insurance. The near-term goal is to avoid having banks hunker
down and ride out the uncertainty, but instead to give them the conﬁdence
to put capital to work. Over time, the goal is to bring about conditions
under which private capital ﬂows back into the banking system.
I would add a fourth play, which is to ensure continued public support
for the difficult decisions involved in plays one to three. An honest
appraisal is that the Treasury in 2007 and 2008 took important and difﬁcult
steps to stabilize the financial system but did not succeed in explaining
them to a skeptical public. An alternative approach to this challenging
necessity is to use populist rhetoric and symbolic actions to create the
political space within which the implicit subsidies involved in resolving
the uncertainty of legacy assets can be undertaken. It remains to be seen
whether this approach will be successful in 2009.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
RENÉ M. STULZ This paper by Phillip Swagel is an extremely useful
one. The author deserves credit for providing an explanation of what the
Treasury was up to from the start of the credit crisis to the end of 2008 and
why. As a result of this paper, generations of future economists will have a
better understanding of the thinking behind various actions by the Trea-
sury. No doubt this is also a very brave paper, because it would be surpris-
ing if future generations thought that 2008 was a time during which the
Treasury addressed the financial market crisis with sufficient wisdom,
skill, and foresight.
In this discussion I will not question a key theme of the Swagel paper,
namely, that many actions that the Treasury might have wanted to under-
take were simply not feasible politically, because Congress would not have
approved them. I have no expertise on this issue. I am also willing to give
Swagel and the Treasury much of the beneﬁt of the doubt when it comes to
actions taken in the midst of the market panic after Lehman Brothers’
bankruptcy. Had I been in the position of Treasury ofﬁcials at that time, I
would have tried to do my best in very difﬁcult circumstances to help the
ﬁnancial markets. But it would be presumptuous to argue that I would have
done better than they did. I do not question that these ofﬁcials were trying
to do their best at that time.
Where these ofﬁcials should not receive the beneﬁt of the doubt is for
what happened before the fall of Lehman. One could argue that the difﬁ-
culties at mortgage banks early in 2007, as well as the sharp decline of var-
ious ABX indices at that time, should have been a wake-up call for
regulators and the Treasury that there were problems in the housing mar-
ket. The next wake-up call was one that could not possibly have escaped
them. It was what John Taylor and John Williams (2008) call the “black
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clear that the ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial institutions were in unknown
territory. In short order this black swan was followed by massive down-
grades of collateralized debt obligations and securitization tranches, by a
dramatic reduction in asset-backed commercial paper outstanding, and by
a freeze in the markets for asset-backed securities. In the language of
Frank Knight, investors seemed to go from the world of risk, where proba-
bilities can be assigned to foreseeable outcomes, to the world of uncer-
tainty, where they thought they had little clue about what the possible
outcomes were and how to assign probabilities to them. From then until
the fall of Lehman, there was ample time for regulators and the Treasury to
have taken action.
The road to Lehman’s bankruptcy was marked with still more wake-up
calls. The fall of Bear Stearns in the spring of 2008 made it transparently
clear that runs on investment banks could take place, because these banks
were funded with large amounts of overnight repos. After Bear Stearns’
failure, one had to know that investment banks were fragile and that what
to do if a run took place was a key question that had to be addressed. Yet
even today a resolution mechanism for such situations is lacking. Although
Swagel focuses on poor underwriting and fraud in the subprime market as
a serious issue, by the time of Bear Stearns’ failure there was not much
more to learn on that issue, if there ever was. The Treasury had been
receiving reports on mortgage fraud all along (the so-called SAR reports
received by Treasury have a mortgage fraud component) and had seen that
it was increasing before the move in the ABX indices in February 2007
(Pendley, Costello, and Kelsch 2007). The fundamental fact about sub-
prime mortgages was always that they were much less risky as long as
home prices were rising.
An observer transported from the summer of 2007 to today would ﬁnd
it hard to believe that the crisis could have caused as much damage as it
did. Many have called it a subprime crisis. At the end of the second quar-
ter of that year, subprime securitized debt amounted to $1.3 trillion.
1 At
least another $300 billion of subprime loans was held on banks’ books
(International Monetary Fund 2008, p. 51). An extreme scenario at that
time would have been that half of all subprime mortgages would go into
default, generating losses of 50 percent: losses expected by Moody’s were
well below this level in 2007 (Moody’s Investor Service 2008a). In such a
scenario, one would have expected a loss of $400 billion on subprime
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market crash of 1987, which did not lead to a massive recession. More-
over, this loss in the subprime market would not have happened all at
once, but rather would have been spread over time.
Why then did the problems in the subprime market lead to such serious
difﬁculties for the ﬁnancial system? The consensus explanation is that
banks and broker-dealers had large positions in securities backed by these
mortgages. Only a fraction, perhaps one-third, of the securitized subprime
mortgages were held by banks. Had these mortgages been held as individ-
ual loans on banks’ books, the losses from their default would have been
recognized slowly over time, as borrowers stopped paying interest and
principal. Banks would have been adversely affected earlier through
required increases in loan provisions. Much of this impact could have been
absorbed by the banks out of their current income. Instead, however, banks
held interests in these mortgages through securities that had to be marked
to market. Marking to market meant that the increase in the probability of
default of these subprime mortgages affected banks’ regulatory capital
immediately. This impact was made worse by the increase in liquidity pre-
miums charged by investors, which would not have affected mortgages
kept on the banks’ books as individual loans rather than as securities. By
reducing the value of the securities through marking to market, the
increase in liquidity premiums adversely affected banks’ regulatory capi-
tal. Marking to market therefore dramatically accelerated the impact of the
worsening prospects of subprime mortgages. As the Bank of England
(2008, pp. 18–20) has pointed out, the drop in the dollar value of triple-A
tranches from subprime securitizations was extremely large. However,
most of that drop appears to have been caused by an increase in liquidity
premiums. In fact, to this day a default on a tranche rated triple-A at
issuance of a subprime securitization has yet to occur.
2
Banks were suffering mark-to-market losses in plain sight in the fall of
2007. It was also clear then that banks would have to take back on their
books securities held by off-balance-sheet vehicles, lowering their regula-
tory capital ratio even more. By then any market participant could tell that
the market for many securities with subprime collateral was not function-
ing properly and that, as a result, banks would have to suffer costs from
marking to market that had not been anticipated when the accounting rules
were put in place.
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ing up of ﬁnancial markets. It was difﬁcult to know which ﬁnancial insti-
tutions were solvent and which were not. Whereas before Lehman’s
failure the markets thought that default by a major counterparty was
highly unlikely, they could no longer believe that in the immediate after-
math of that debacle. The freeze of money markets that occurred at the
same time heightened concerns about ﬁre sales of assets even further. Yet
counterparty risk was already a concern much earlier. In fact, regulators
were well aware of it. A report by senior supervisors of the most ﬁnan-
cially developed countries, published in April 2008, reported discussions
with banks in which they raised concerns about counterparty risk to guar-
antors. The report then added, “Subsequent to our meetings, these con-
cerns have become more widespread and pronounced across the industry,
with many ﬁrms’ exposures continuing to grow through year-end 2007”
(Senior Supervisors Group 2008, p. 19) Thus, the counterparty risk prob-
lem did not come out of nowhere in September 2008. There was ample
warning of it.
For the markets and for most observers, August 2007 was an unex-
pected lightning strike. Even those who at times get credit for having fore-
cast the crisis did not predict the events of that month. The dramatic move
in LIBOR that occurred then had never before been seen, nor had many of
the other events that transpired. To be sure, many of the regulators of
ﬁnancial institutions had gone on a long vacation. The Treasury appeared
focused on reducing regulation. A commission of academics, aptly named
for the secretary of the Treasury and with his apparent blessing, was push-
ing for deregulation in the ﬁnancial industry. Even after the start of the cri-
sis, the focus of the Treasury was still on deregulation. But in August 2007
the regulatory vacation should have been over. The focus should have been
on making sure that worst-case scenarios could be handled effectively and
that contingency plans were in place. It is quite clear that there was much
concern about moral hazard in 2008. Yet not much can be done about
moral hazard in the midst of a crisis. If the objective of letting Lehman go
under was to reduce moral hazard in the future, by showing that the Trea-
sury was willing to let large ﬁnancial institutions go bankrupt, this was a
complete failure. Instead, letting Lehman fail put moral hazard on steroids,
and it is not clear how moral hazard will ever be restored to where it was
before Lehman’s demise. Controlling moral hazard is critical when the
taxpayers are the insurers of banks. It cannot be done without regulation
and robust enforcement. However, the regulators also have to be provided
with the right incentives to do their job. They did not have these incentives
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regime was at times too intrusive and at other times nonexistent. Unfortu-
nately, trying to install regulation “lite” may have had the unintended
effect of creating a world in which much more intrusive regulation, which
may hurt economic growth in the United States, is likely.
There has been much criticism of banks’ risk management practices.
However, the ofﬁcial sector has a clear risk management task: to avoid,
plan for, and resolve systemic events. No bank has failed at risk manage-
ment as badly as the ofﬁcial sector has. Banks are not responsible for sys-
temic risk. They face complicated trade-offs between risk and return. The
task for the Treasury and the rest of the ofﬁcial sector was to focus on
events that could endanger the ﬁnancial system and be ready for them. At
this they failed.
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COMMENT BY
LUIGI ZINGALES The end of an administration is no time to have a
ﬁnancial crisis, and the end of the George W. Bush administration was an
especially inopportune time. With its senior staff substantially reduced and
the remaining political appointees potentially distracted by concerns about
their next job, the most powerful Treasury in the world found itself in late
2007 and 2008 without the human capital needed to plan for and deal with
the worst ﬁnancial crisis in three generations. Worse still, by that time the
administration had lost the trust of Congress over the alleged weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq, and the unpopular president was all but missing
from the scene. This paper by Phillip Swagel provides some 60 pages of
detailed description of the events of this period, yet President Bush appears
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team for their efforts.
In this context, Swagel should be thrice commended. First, he should be
commended for serving his country with passion and dedication until the
end of his appointment. Although I disagree with many of the choices
made, I have complete faith that Swagel worked with only with the interest
of the country at heart. Second, he should be commended for consenting to
serve as the public voice and face of an unpopular administration. Last but
not least, he should be commended for the candor with which he has writ-
ten this account of his extraordinary time at the Treasury. I think historians
will long use his chronicle as the best description of what was going on at
those critical moments.
It is precisely this candor that makes my role as a discussant easy, per-
haps unfairly so. Although I write without the full beneﬁt of hindsight—
the crisis has yet to run its course, making it too early to draw final
lessons—I certainly beneﬁt from more information and more time to
process it than Swagel and the other key players had at the time. Most
important, criticizing other people’s choices is much easier than improving
upon them.
With all these caveats, however, my role as discussant is to point out the
contradictions and limitations in Swagel’s account. Only by reviewing and
criticizing the decisions made in this crisis can the economic policy com-
munity train itself and prepare for the next one. Just as the analysis of
the policy mistakes at the onset of the Great Depression proved useful in
informing the decisions made at the onset of the current crisis, so, too, one
may hope, analysis of the mistakes made at the onset of this crisis will help
tomorrow’s policymakers cope with or even avoid the next one.
Let me ﬁrst point out the elements of Swagel’s narrative most likely to
suffer from the naturally “self-serving” bias he honestly admits to. The
ﬁrst regards the role played by the lack of legal authority, which, according
to Swagel, prevented the Treasury from taking all the actions it deemed
appropriate to deal with the crisis. Obviously, the United States is a coun-
try of law, and an administration cannot intervene in ﬁnancial markets
without legal authority. But this limitation is not so clear cut as Swagel
makes it out to be. In March 2008 the Federal Reserve had dubious legal
authority to lend to Bear Stearns, yet it found a mechanism (lending to J.P.
Morgan to purchase Bear Stearns) by which to do so. It had no legal
authority to buy toxic assets from Bear Stearns, yet, as Swagel describes, it
found a trick to make it happen. The Treasury had no authority to force the
major banks to take TARP money, but by exercising moral suasion it was
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sion wielded by U.S. bank regulators that bankers often joke that when the
regulators tell them to jump, they can only ask, “How high?” When one
considers these various capacities in their totality—the Fed’s control over
whom to lend to, the FDIC’s authority to take over bank subsidiaries (but
not bank holding companies) that pose a systemic risk, the Treasury’s abil-
ity to exercise moral suasion—it is clear there was some power to inter-
vene, had there been the political will. For example, the Fed could have
mandated a very large bank recapitalization, with the Treasury offering to
provide the capital in case the market was unwilling to do so.
Thus, the real problem was the lack of political will, and the real ques-
tion is why it was lacking. Was it because the Treasury experts really
thought that buying toxic assets was the right solution, or because the lob-
bying pressure to do so was overwhelming? Unfortunately, it is here that
Swagel’s account is uncharacteristically lacking in detail: the paper con-
tains no mention of any lobbying pressure from the ﬁnancial industry. Is it
possible that an industry that in 2008 spent $422 million in lobbying
expenses played no role in shaping a policy so crucial for its survival?
Why is the paper silent about these pressures?
The second potentially self-serving bias in Swagel’s account is the
emphasis on the limits imposed by Congress, which the paper amply
blames as the source of all the administration’s woes. Much of the paper
suggests or implies that if only Treasury ofﬁcials could have made Con-
gress do what they wanted, the world today would be a better place. To be
sure, Congress has imposed and still imposes limits on what an administra-
tion can do. But this is not necessarily a bad thing; in fact, this country was
founded on the premise that there should be no taxation without representa-
tion and that each branch of government should exercise a check over the
others. Decisions that impose a ﬁscal burden on U.S. taxpayers are and
should be subject to the approval of their elected representatives. Of course,
Congress does not always perform this job perfectly, and often individual
representatives in powerful positions pursue their own agendas rather than
the interest of the American people. But that does not justify the implicit
call, which percolates through Swagel’s account, for freeing the administra-
tion from congressional oversight. In fact, more useful than a blunt attack
on Congress as a body would have been a detailed account of the self-serv-
ing constraints that individual members may have put on the path to a supe-
rior solution. Yet the only constraints that Swagel outlines in some detail
appear to have been imposed not by self-serving minority interests, but by
the lack of political (and popular) consensus on the proposed policies—
which in a democracy should be a constraint.
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who overextended themselves ﬁnancially to buy a house was not only a
legitimate democratic constraint, but also good economic policy. And with
the right amount of ingenuity, the negative home equity problem could
have been (and still could be) resolved without violating this constraint
(see, for example, Zingales 2008a and Posner and Zingales 2009). Simi-
larly, when Congress balked at the prospect of handing out billions of
dollars to the banks through the TARP, that was not a manifestation of
congressional myopia, but rather an indictment of a Treasury secretary
more used to strong-arming corporate boards than to eliciting popular con-
sensus. The September 29, 2008, House vote against the TARP, far from
being the short-sighted response of a hopelessly politicized Congress, was
in fact a high point of American democracy. Undaunted by the dramatic
headlines and the catastrophic forecasts issued by Secretary Paulson and
Fed Chairman Bernanke, Congress realized the dangers involved in issu-
ing a $700 billion blank check—and voted no. In fact, if there are grounds
for criticizing Congress’s performance in this episode, it is for later revers-
ing its vote under the enticement of a heavy dose of pork-barrel add-ons.
This view of Congress as an obstacle to the Treasury’s enlightened lead-
ership, rather than as an equal player exercising proper constitutional bal-
ance, is what leads Swagel to congratulate the Treasury and the Fed for
engaging in various ﬁnancial engineering maneuvers aimed at imposing a
ﬁscal burden on taxpayers without Congress’ approval. One example is the
nonrecourse loans offered by the Fed to Bear Stearns. Another is the guar-
antees offered to Citigroup and Bank of America. It is sad to learn that
Swagel regrets that the Paulson Treasury took too long to fully appreciate
the power of these tricks, leaving to the Obama administration the rare priv-
ilege of actually implementing the most deceptive ones. Having written
against the use of these interventions by Paulson’s successor, Tim Geithner
(Veronesi and Zingales 2009), I believe I can criticize their creation by the
Paulson team without fear of being accused of bias. It is precisely these
types of tricks that feed the mistrust that Congress and the American people
have toward the administration. As Swagel aptly describes, congressional
mistrust toward the Treasury had very negative consequences during the
crisis. But Swagel’s own account provides the justiﬁcation for that mistrust.
We know from microeconomics that any choice can be represented as
the optimal one, depending on how one characterizes the constraints that
apply. Swagel’s description of the Bush Treasury’s political constraints
seems calculated in exactly this manner, as a means of relieving the
administration of any responsibility for making the wrong decision: if the
chosen strategy was the only feasible one, it must also have been the opti-
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absence of alternatives even after the Treasury’s policy changed course
dramatically in a matter of weeks. Whence the change in policy? The con-
straints had changed!
This Manichean view of an enlightened elite ﬁghting against the neu-
tering constraints imposed by Congress prevents Swagel from discussing
the other feasible options in greater detail. Since the approval of the
TARP, academics have produced detailed analyses of the costs and bene-
ﬁts of several such alternatives: from asset purchases to debt guarantees,
from equity infusions to long-term put options to a spinoff of toxic assets
into a “bad bank” (Philippon and Schnabl 2009; Caballero and Kurlat
2009; Landier and Ueda 2009; Veronesi and Zingales 2008; Zingales
2009). Similar discussions should have taken place inside the Treasury
and the Fed before any decision was made. Yet Swagel’s account pro-
vides no evidence that the costs and beneﬁts were seriously debated. As
he correctly points out, the turning point was the Bear Stearns crisis. Up
to that point the administration could cultivate the illusion that the crisis
would remain contained; afterward there was no excuse. Indeed, as
Swagel recounts, it was after Bear Stearns that the Treasury started think-
ing about what he calls the “break the glass” policy—what to do in the
event of a systemwide collapse. From the Bear Stearns rescue to the
Lehman collapse, six months went by. What was the Treasury able to pro-
duce in that time? By Swagel’s own admission, only the three pages of
draft legislation that Paulson presented to Congress on September 20 and
that led to the TARP. There is no mention of any intellectual discussion,
no mention of any internal disagreement, no mention of any assessment of
costs and beneﬁts. This deafening silence in Swagel’s account does noth-
ing to dispel the pervasive (and, one hopes, wrong) view that the TARP
was just a welfare plan for needy bankers pushed by Wall Street upon
their friends in the government.
Even if the TARP had been the right break-the-glass plan—which it
was not, as I wrote at the time (Zingales 2008b) and as Paulson himself
later admitted—the fact that the plan required two full months to become
implementable (as Swagel clearly details) validates the accusation of
incompetence raised against the Paulson Treasury. What would one say
about a hurricane emergency plan that took two months after the calamity
to start working? Why were the details of a plan that had been conceived
by at least March not fully worked out by September? If lack of staff is the
reason, then the Obama administration is right to make the creation of a
more permanent research department at the Treasury a priority.
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also for what it does not say. There is no mention of any economic prin-
ciples guiding the Paulson Treasury. All its actions seem to have been
guided entirely by legal and political constraints, without any overarching
aim. Even if one accepts the idea that these constraints were rigidly bind-
ing, a well-justiﬁed strategy would have been helpful not only in selling
the plan to Congress and the country, but also in avoiding confusion in the
markets. After all, the government’s actions during the course of the crisis
were all over the map—from bailing out creditors but not shareholders in
Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, to wiping out both in Lehman
Brothers and Washington Mutual, to bailing out both in AIG, Citigroup,
and since. In the words of the legendary Yale endowment manager David
Swensen, “they’ve [acted] with an extraordinary degree of inconsistency.
You almost have to be trying to do things in an incoherent and inconsis-
tent way to have ended up with the huge range of ways that they have
come up with to address these problems.”
1 Nor has this inconsistency
escaped the notice of ordinary Americans. In a representative survey of
more than 1,000 American households conducted in December 2008, 80
percent declared that they felt less conﬁdent about investing in ﬁnancial
markets as a result of the type of government intervention undertaken in
the last three months of 2008 (Sapienza and Zingales 2009b). This out-
come did not stem from an ideological bias against government involve-
ment; on the contrary, a majority of respondents expressed the belief that
the government must regulate ﬁnancial markets. What they objected to
was the speciﬁcs. It is hard to estimate the real damage created by this
inconsistency. What is known is that it had major negative effects on the
level of trust that Americans have in the stock market (Sapienza and Zin-
gales 2009a), leading them to shun investing in equities (Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales 2008).
In his conclusion, Swagel nicely summarizes the four key dimensions
along which a rescue plan should be evaluated: shutting down the zombie
banks, adequately recapitalizing the solvent ones, eliminating uncertainty
about the surviving institutions, and maintaining consensus on all these
actions. Swagel admits failure on the ﬁrst and last counts—the Paulson
Treasury was unable to be selective in the allocation of TARP money and
unable to maintain political consensus—but he claims victory on the other
two. A ﬁnal judgment is certainly premature.
1. FOXBusiness, “Yale’s Swensen: Pols Missing the Point,” January 6, 2009 (www.
foxbusiness.com/search-results/m/21735678/yale-s-swensen-pols-missing-the-point.htm).
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declared victory only to discover later that it would have to go through four
more recapitalizations (Hoshi and Kashyap 2008). But even at this early
date, Swagel’s claim of victory seems hollow. As the recent bank stress
tests have shown, the capital injections under the CPP program were insuf-
ﬁcient to make troubled institutions fully viable, but sufﬁcient to allow
insolvent ones to keep limping along. The very fact that additional inter-
ventions had to be undertaken to support Citigroup and Bank of America
after the ﬁrst CPP injection suggests that the second and third goals had not
been reached. Although Swagel is right in pointing out that after the CPP
program the tension in ﬁnancial markets subsided, it is unclear whether
most of the credit goes to the capital injection or to the FDIC debt guaran-
tee. And even if the Treasury is given full credit for stopping the panic in
October 2008, one cannot ignore the fact that the Treasury shares much of
the blame for creating that panic to begin with.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Several panelists praised Swagel for shar-
ing his insider perspective and for his frank description and assessment of
the events he had witnessed. Alan Blinder summarized the paper’s main
point as follows: critics, particularly academics, pay too little attention to
the legal and political constraints faced by the Treasury. And there are
times when Treasury ofﬁcials would like to take certain actions but
refrain from seeking the authority because they are convinced Congress
will not grant it. Blinder framed the rest of his comment by citing the
motto of Montagu Norman, former head of the Bank of England: “Never
explain, never apologize.” Although the Paulson Treasury never enunci-
ated it, in Blinder’s view it operated under this motto. That said, Blinder
did not believe the Paulson Treasury should be excused for its actions or
its inactions. There are two ways to get around a legal constraint: either go
to Congress to have the constraint relaxed, as the Paulson Treasury
attempted with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or get clever and ﬁnd ways
to get around the constraint within the law, as was done with the national-
ization of AIG. Blinder disputed Swagel’s point that, in the law-based
society of the United States, banks cannot be forced to accept capital. He
noted that Paulson did force some banks to take capital against their will,
under the pretext of preventing stigmatization of other banks, and those
banks made it very clear to the press that they did not want the money.
Blinder also pointed out that although the TARP legislation mentioned
foreclosure avoidance 12 to 15 times, no TARP dollars were used for that
purpose during the Bush administration.
Daron Acemoglu noted that thinking about constraints is important,
but that it is also important to consider the process, in particular its grad-
ual nature. He described the Bush administration’s approach as taking
whatever action sufﬁced to keep an institution alive and then waiting to
see what happened next. This strategy is correct, he argued, in a single-
player decision problem, but when dealing with markets, gradual action
may be counterproductive because there is a specter of something bad,
like bankruptcy, nationalization, or other types of asset sales, happening
at the end. This uncertainty breeds inaction and might make the problem
much worse. Instead, Acemoglu suggested a different way of thinking
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making a decision and sticking to it is better than letting events unfold
gradually.
Robert Hall brought to the Panel’s attention a factor that had been
underdiscussed but was, in his view, responsible for some of the economic
distress in the commercial paper market following the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy, namely, the failure of money market mutual funds to behave
like true mutual funds. One problem is that the “penny rounding rule” of
the Securities and Exchange Commission allows money market funds to
pay a withdrawal as if the fund’s net asset value per share were $1 as long
as the actual net asset value is between $0.995 to $1.005. This rule by itself
provides a strong incentive for investors to withdraw when net asset value
drops below $1. In addition, it appears that some funds did not write down
their net asset value by enough when Lehman went bankrupt, further
increasing the incentive for a run. Hall claimed that these two factors
effectively turned money market funds into depository institutions and
made them susceptible to runs. The Lehman bankruptcy might have gone
more smoothly, he asserted, had the Reserve Fund, a large money market
fund, immediately lowered its net asset value to a realistic level, so that
early withdrawals did not have an advantage over later withdrawals. The
run on money market funds caused the commercial paper market to fall
apart, because these funds were among the main buyers. Hall argued that
the central problem was that money market mutual funds wanted to be
banks and not mutual funds, and that the SEC had failed to insist that they
behave like mutual funds.
Justin Wolfers complimented Swagel on a compelling paper, from
which he and others had learned a great deal about the political and legal
constraints on policymakers. He was distressed that economists as a group
know so little about how policy is really made, and he faulted the White
House and the Treasury for not better communicating those constraints, as
well as the economics profession for not taking those constraints seriously.
He took issue with the veneration of political naïveté expressed in Luigi
Zingales’s comment, arguing instead that to take public positions on
important policy issues without knowledge of the political process is a big
mistake.
Zingales countered that economists should say what they think are the
proper actions to take, regardless of the political constraints. Constraints
are endogenous, and economists can help bring pressure to bear to modify
those constraints. Paulson himself, for example, changed his ideas on cap-
ital injection as a result of pressure from the economics profession. Zin-
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cal constraints on policymakers, they should not criticize policymakers
when constraints prevent them from taking recommended actions.
Caroline Hoxby questioned the asymmetry in the Treasury’s use of
TARP funds. People were concerned initially about the exact value of the
assets to be bought and argued over whether it was, say, 76 or 81 cents on
the dollar. In contrast, no such calculations were made for the multitude of
other ways the stimulus money was spent. She wondered why the Treasury
did not say up front that it might inadvertently buy assets at the wrong
price, thus ending up throwing money away, but that even if they bought at
76 cents something that later proved to be worth 38 cents, the amount of
money thrown away was at least eventually known. She observed that
today money is being thrown away in many directions, whereas the earlier
troubled assets likely would have recovered their value. It concerned her
that the Treasury was too worried about getting the prices right, which
ended up making matters worse.
Frederic Mishkin expressed concern about the Treasury’s capital injec-
tions into banks, particularly the absence of conditions placed on taking
the money in order to get all the banks to take it and avoid stigma. He
noted that in MBA ethics courses, students are taught to maximize share-
holder value. Under this principle, capital given to a business with a lot of
debt should be used to pay the shareholders and other stakeholders, and
potentially to give bonuses to management. He agreed that “getting
clever,” as Blinder put it, is important in tough times, and he acknowl-
edged that the Federal Reserve had reasonably acted at the limits of its
legal authority. Mishkin raised the issue of the importance of the AIG
bankruptcy in comparison to Lehman Brothers. He felt that Lehman’s
downturn had been expected and therefore did not shake up the markets as
badly as the surprising collapse of AIG, which revealed the rot in the entire
ﬁnancial system, causing a systemwide blowup.
David Romer asked why, if the Treasury had been working on the
break-the-glass plan since March 2008, the bill that emerged in September
2008 was so minimal. He also wondered whether Swagel agreed with the
claims of Paul Krugman and others that regulators interact so much with
the ﬁnancial markets that it causes them to give greater weight to the inter-
ests of Wall Street than to the general public welfare.
John Campbell noted that during the boom years credit ratings had been
extended to new types of instruments carrying systemic risk, and that this
had allowed investors to buy assets within a credit rating constraint yet still
load up on systemic risk. The credit rating agencies had moved outside
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become corrupted. He wondered at what point the Treasury had become
aware of this problem and whether anything could have been done early on
to mitigate its effects.
Benjamin Friedman expressed reservations about the use of the central
bank to conduct what amounts to a shadow ﬁscal policy, which it does
when it assumes credit risk. He noted that there is a reason why ﬁscal
actions should go through Congress, namely, that such actions use tax-
payer money, and he expressed concern that the end result, should the Fed-
eral Reserve take losses on the amounts it has advanced in private credit
during this episode, would be to compromise central bank independence.
He also underlined a distinction, which he felt had been overlooked,
between two types of losses. The ﬁrst involves a genuine loss to the econ-
omy, as in the case of a decline in the price of a home. Someone bears the
loss, whether it be the homeowner, the lender, an investor who bought
the securitized loan, or the taxpayer if the Treasury steps in to bail out the
investor. The second involves a zero-sum loss, in which one party gains
exactly what the other loses. Although the distinction might not matter to
an individual institution that loses money, for the system as a whole, which
is the ultimate concern of public policy, the two types of losses are very
different.
Charles Schultze interpreted René Stulz’s comment to say that under-
writing standards were not an important factor in causing the ﬁnancial cri-
sis. But, he pointed out, between mid-September 2008 and mid-March
2009, the ABX price index for the second-half 2005 vintage of PENAAA
subprime mortgage-backed securities fell from 96 to 83, whereas for the
ﬁrst-half 2007 vintage, the index declined from 57 to 26. Schultze argued
that the large erosion of underwriting standards, combined with market
uncertainty about how it had affected the quality of the portfolios of indi-
vidual ﬁnancial institutions, accounted for this pattern. He also thought
worth mentioning, even though of little relevance to the paper, the role that
annual bonuses had played in the decline of underwriting standards. In
response, Stulz explained that he did not mean to say that underwriting
was unimportant, but that there had been no visible change in standards
consistent with the facts mentioned in the paper. He noted that fraud was
very important at the end of the timeframe discussed, but he did not view it
as a driving factor.
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